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TOWARD A THEORY OF PRECEDENT IN ARBITRATION

W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER*
ABSTRACT
Do arbitrators create precedent? The claim that they do not recurs
throughout much of the arbitration literature. Instead, arbitration
often is viewed as an ad hoc forum in which arbitrators do justice (at
best) within the confines of particular cases. As an empirical matter,
however, it is increasingly clear that, in some arbitration systems,
arbitrators often cite to other arbitrators, claim to rely on past
awards, and promote adjudicatory consistency as an important
system norm. Much like courts, then, arbitrators can (but do not
always) create precedent that guides future behavior and provides a
language in which disputants, lawyers, and adjudicators can express
and resolve grievances.
This Article provides a theoretical foundation for understanding
the conditions under which precedent will (or will not) arise in
arbitration. It identifies three considerations that may account for
the development of precedent across a range of arbitration systems:
(1) whether the system is structurally conducive to the creation of
precedent; (2) whether arbitral precedent benefits the parties by
filling gaps in (or displacing) state-supplied law; and (3) whether
arbitrators are likely to be viewed as legitimate producers of law
within the relevant context. After explaining the relevance of these
considerations, the Article explores how they might apply in different
arbitration contexts and sets forth a research agenda capable of
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Kimbrough for library and research assistance, to Andrew Gatt and Natalie Gominger for
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shedding light on arbitration not only as a mechanism for resolving
disputes, but also as a mechanism for generating robust systems of
privately made law.
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INTRODUCTION
Do arbitrators create precedent? The claim that they do not
recurs throughout the arbitration literature. Yet this claim conflicts
with a small but growing body of evidence that, in some arbitration
systems, arbitrators frequently cite to other arbitrators, claim to
rely on past awards, and promote adjudicatory consistency as an
important system goal. Thus, although not every system of arbitration generates precedent, some clearly do.
Both theoretically and empirically, however, arbitral precedent
remains a poorly understood phenomenon. As a result, assessments
of arbitration’s lawmaking potential vary significantly. At one end
of the spectrum, some associate arbitration with confidentiality and
secrecy and assert a conflict between these characteristics and the
production of law. Thus, “[w]hatever else arbitration may be, it is
not ‘law’—the kind of findable, studiable, arguable, appealable,
Restateable kind of law” that courts produce.1 By contrast, other
conceptions of arbitration’s lawmaking capacity are expansive,
even raising the possibility that some systems of arbitration
inevitably yield “substantive results that have a systemic character.”2 If so, the question becomes whether “modern-day arbitrators
fashion a commercial, antitrust, employment, maritime, securities,
and contract law?”3
There are at least two reasons why such disparate conceptions of
arbitration persist. First, despite long-standing interest in the topic,
little effort has been made to identify the conditions under which
arbitral precedent might arise. Too often, arbitration is portrayed
as a unitary phenomenon—one that either is or is not capable of
generating precedent. By failing to accommodate the diverse array
of arbitration practices, the literature fails to yield testable hypotheses concerning the creation and use of precedent in arbitration.
Second, even if there were well-articulated theoretical reasons to
believe that some arbitration systems generate precedent, the
1. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 766 (2002).
2. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Law-Making, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1183, 1205 (2004).
3. Id. at 1202.
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limited empirical evidence makes it difficult to compare arbitrator
behavior across systems.
This Article begins the process of filling these gaps. It provides a
theoretical foundation for understanding the conditions under which
precedent is (or is not) likely to evolve in arbitration. I use the term
“evolve” because few if any systems of arbitration are designed with
the intent to create a body of precedent. To the contrary, arbitral
precedent typically arises, if at all, in systems intended “merely” to
resolve disputes.
By referring to arbitral precedent I do not mean that past awards
determine the outcome of future disputes. They do not. Nor do I
argue that awards necessarily constrain the discretion of future
arbitrators. As I will explain, there are cases in which, for very
pragmatic reasons, an arbitrator may have little choice but to follow
past awards.4 There undoubtedly are other cases in which past
awards play a less substantial but still material constraining role.
But arbitral awards need not serve this constraining function to
constitute precedent. The extent to which judicial precedent constrains judges is itself a matter of debate.5 Yet judicial precedent
remains an important legal and social phenomenon, shaping the
arguments lawyers make, the explanations adjudicators provide,
and serving as a focal point around which parties can order their

4. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75 and Part II.A.3.
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 67-77 (2008)
(summarizing and critiquing attitudinal and rational choice models of precedent as applied
to Supreme Court cases). Judges, of course, are often formally bound by the decisions of courts
superior in the hierarchy. Because arbitration typically lacks an appellate mechanism, this
form of vertical precedent does not exist. Yet it is questionable whether vertical precedent
serves as a material constraint on case outcomes. Among other reasons for skepticism is the
fact that, although decision rules announced by superior courts are binding on inferior courts,
most disputes will potentially implicate a host of competing decision rules, each of which may
be binding within its sphere. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal
Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1440-43 (2000) (discussing indeterminancy of legal rules); see
also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 83-87, 115-19 (1997) (summarizing
empirical evidence with respect to lower courts). The lack of vertical precedent, moreover,
does not necessarily mean that arbitration systems will produce a conflicting body of
precedents. Arbitrators, unlike judges, are subject to market constraints and will apply
consistent rules if that is what the parties want. See Christopher J. Bruce, The Adjudication
of Labor Disputes as a Private Good, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 8 (1988).
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affairs.6 Where it exists, the same can be said about arbitral
precedent.7
Note that this definition means that I am primarily interested in
precedent as an observable phenomenon, even though precedent
may sometimes operate in ways that cannot readily be observed.
As an example, consider a system in which arbitrators decide cases
but do not provide any explanation for their decisions and do not
make their awards available to anyone but the parties.8 Within the
system, of course, arbitrators are familiar with their own past
decisions and may strive to maintain consistency across cases.
Moreover, when arbitrators sit in panels of three, they may share
information about previous decisions. In each scenario, knowledge
of past decisions may shape a decision made today. We might therefore describe the arbitration system as “precedential” even if it
produces awards that obscure the operation of precedent and even
if the disputants themselves are unaware that precedent exists.
Such unobservable forms of precedent, however, are not the focus
of this Article. As I use the term, arbitration generates precedent if
awards have some observable relevance to the future conduct of
system participants.9 For example, parties might order their affairs,
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 967-69 (2005) (describing precedent’s role as a modality of argumentation);
Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 108992, 1113-18 (arguing that adjudication serves an expressive function that influences future
behavior and that public adjudicators are superior in this regard to private adjudicators like
arbitrators).
7. This is not to say that arbitral precedent serves these functions as well as judicial
precedent, see McAdams, supra note 6, at 1116-17, only that it is worthy of study, regardless
of its constraining effect on future arbitrators.
8. This model approximates the use of arbitration to resolve disputes among members
of the New York Diamond Dealers Club. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-26
(1992). DDC arbitration may or may not be precedential in the sense described in the text. See
id. at 154 (noting that past decisions are poor predictors of future decisions). The point,
rather, is that a system structured in the manner of the DDC might be precedential, in some
meaningful sense, even if the awards it produces yield no evidence of this.
9. At times throughout this Article, I will use the term “system users” to refer to the
parties and their lawyers, each of whom can reasonably be viewed as consumers of arbitration
services, yet also as discrete actors who may use the arbitration process to pursue their own
agendas. I use the term “system participants” to refer collectively to actors that play a
relatively direct role in shaping the arbitration process: parties, lawyers, arbitrators, and
arbitral institutions like the American Arbitration Association or the International Chamber
of Commerce.
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and lawyers might structure their arguments, around rules
announced in past awards. Likewise, arbitrators may justify their
decisions, at least in part, by invoking past awards or principles
deducible from past awards. Indeed, I focus in particular on how
arbitrators justify their decisions, for the practice of citing to and
engaging with past awards suggests that system participants invest
those awards with “normative authority” and that arbitrators view
themselves as engaged in a lawmaking enterprise.10
I adopt this definition for two reasons. First, although the existing literature often does not define the term, the definition
approximates the one implicitly used by most authors. Second, the
definition emphasizes precedent’s important functional qualities,
including the possibility that precedent facilitates private ordering
by articulating rules that parties expect future arbitrators to follow.
As another example of these functional qualities, consider the
possibility that precedent may legitimize the result of the arbitration for the losing party, perhaps by suggesting that the result is
justified by some normative criterion—say, the belief that similarly
situated litigants should receive equal treatment—that the losing
party is likely to accept. If it is to serve these and other important
functions, arbitral precedent must be observable to the relevant
constituency. To use an obvious example, third parties cannot easily
structure their behavior around a rule of arbitral precedent if they
do not know that the rule exists.
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the existing debate over
arbitration’s capacity to generate precedent. To frame the discussion
that follows, Part I also offers several examples of systems in which
arbitrators’ awards appear to have precedential force. Although
fundamentally different in design and purpose, these diverse
systems of arbitration illustrate the wide range of contexts in which
precedent may evolve and provide clues into how an arbitration
system’s characteristics may shape this process.
Part II then suggests that, notwithstanding the diverse range of
arbitration contexts, a core set of considerations may help explain
whether arbitral precedent is likely to evolve. Part II identifies
three such considerations: (1) whether the arbitration system is
10. GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 3.
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structurally conducive to the creation of precedent, (2) whether
arbitral precedent functions to fill gaps in (or displace) statesupplied law, and (3) whether arbitrators are likely to be viewed as
legitimate producers of law in the relevant context. Drawing on this
general theoretical discussion, Part III then formulates more
specific hypotheses about arbitral precedent11 and offers tentative
answers to the question posed at the outset of this Article: “Do
modern-day arbitrators fashion a commercial, antitrust, employment, maritime, securities, and contract law?”12
I. ARBITRATION AS CAPABLE OF GENERATING PRECEDENT
A. A Traditional View (with Caveats): Arbitration as
Particularized, Ad Hoc Decision Making
A number of arguments support the claim that arbitration does
not generate precedent. For one thing, participants in private
dispute resolution systems may lack sufficient lawmaking incentives.13 Judges and litigants generally do not obtain, and in any
event would have difficulty enforcing, property rights in precedent.14
The production of law thus confers an uncompensated benefit on
third parties, and “[w]hy would litigants who engage the services of
a rent-a-judge want to pay extra for a reasoned opinion enunciating
a rule that benefits only future litigants?”15
The claim that arbitration does not generate precedent also is
based on certain structural characteristics that are commonly—
though perhaps too readily—associated with arbitration. For
example, it is often said that arbitrators need not follow the law and
may instead resolve disputes in whatever fashion they deem just.16
11. In other ongoing work, I am exploring some of these hypotheses in several domestic
arbitration systems within the United States.
12. Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1202.
13. For the classic version of this argument, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 238-39 (1979). For more recent
articulations, see David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2622-23 (1995); McAdams, supra note 6, at 1113-15.
14. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271-72 (1976).
15. Luban, supra note 13, at 2622.
16. Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1992);
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Arbitrators need not issue reasoned awards explaining the basis of
their decisions.17 Many arbitration proceedings and awards are kept
private, denying the public and future disputants information about
past decisions.18 Arbitration also lacks formal legal mechanisms for
ensuring that arbitrators reach consistent decisions, such as a doctrine of stare decisis19 or an appellate mechanism.20 And finally,
parties to arbitration agreements may exercise control over the
system’s capacity to generate precedent. Their contracts may limit
the precedential value of past awards21 or require each party to keep
arbitration results confidential.22
For those who attribute these characteristics to the institution
of arbitration generally, the resulting picture naturally is one of
particularized, ad hoc decision making. In this picture, arbitrators
do justice (at best) within the unique confines of individual cases;
they do not apply, much less create, legal rules.23 Unlike courts,
which “are bound by precedent” and, even when not bound, “should
give serious consideration” to other judicial opinions,24 arbitrators
Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lynn Basset, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (2004).
A separate though related point is that existing standards for judicial review may effectively
permit arbitrators to disregard or misapply mandatory legal rules. See Stephen J. Ware,
Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 711-12 (1999).
17. E.g., Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40
TEX. INT’L L.J. 449, 512-14 (2005).
18. Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common Law,
2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11 (2003); Perschbacher & Basset, supra note 16, at 30.
19. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1009
(2005) (noting that the doctrine of stare decisis, which is absent in arbitration, “extricate[s
trial judges] from an arbitration-type regime in which they resolve disputes but do not make
law”); see also Alderman, supra note 18, at 11; Peter B. Rutledge Toward a Contractual
Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151, 167 (2004); Clyde W. Summers,
Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling To Arbitrate, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 704 (2004).
20. Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 208 (2006)
(noting that lack of an appellate mechanism means that “conflicting awards may persist”);
Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 239.
21. See, e.g., Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/
index.html (follow “Customer Agreement” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
Verizon Agreement] (“An arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only to that
specific case; it can’t be used in any other case except to enforce the award itself.”).
22. See, e.g., ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2008).
23. Alderman, supra note 18, at 11-12; Perschbacher & Basset, supra note 16, at 29-30.
24. Alderman, supra note 18, at 4.
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are presumed unwilling or unable to situate the disputes over which
they preside within a wider body of similar disputes. As a result,
past awards do not inform, much less control, future arbitrators.25
It follows, too, that arbitrators cannot change existing law; they
cannot announce new legal rules to guide future behavior.26
Though accurate to a degree, the foregoing picture of arbitration
is quite stylized. It proffers a vision of “folklore arbitration”27 that
primarily reflects assumptions about domestic arbitration practices
within the United States. Even within that sphere, it corresponds
imperfectly to a market reality in which arbitrators and arbitral
institutions offer a diverse range of arbitration products.28 For
example, parties often do pay arbitrators to produce reasoned
awards,29 and these awards are often made available to the public.30
Future parties may seek to use these awards as “persuasive evidence” of the appropriate outcome to their dispute.31 They may even
require arbitrators to follow prior arbitration awards, potentially
yielding, over time, a “sophisticated, comprehensive,” and entirely
private system of laws.32 Given the resulting diversity of arbitration
25. Knapp, supra note 1, at 785.
26. Alderman, supra note 18, at 12; see also Knapp, supra note 1, at 785.
27. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration,
74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 42-45 (1999).
28. See Rutledge, supra note 19, at 161-65; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration
Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 655, 660-63 (2007).
29. For example, contracts frequently incorporate arbitration service provider rules that
instruct arbitrators to provide at least a brief explanation for their awards unless the parties
agree otherwise. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 39C (Am.
Arbitration Ass’n 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#39; JAMS EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 24(h) (Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs., Inc.
2009), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/; see also Richard C. Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1085 (2000) (noting benefits to parties and arbitrators of
reasoned awards).
30. See, e.g., CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES R. 12904(h) (Fin.
Indus. Regulatory Auth. 2010), http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Rules/Codeof
ArbitrationProcedure (follow “Customer Code” hyperlink) (providing that securities arbitration awards—most of which are unreasoned—are to be made publicly available); EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 39B (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009), http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#39 (providing that AAA employment awards are to be available to
the public on a cost basis).
31. Reuben, supra note 29, at 1085.
32. Ware, supra note 16, at 746-47.
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practices, some arbitration scholars have recognized that arbitration
systems have the capacity to generate precedent.33 Evidence from a
number of arbitration systems, both international and within the
United States, supports this view.34
The following Section describes the evidence relevant to three
such systems: international investment arbitration conducted by
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), international commercial arbitration, and labor arbitration
within the United States. In many respects, these three systems of
arbitration have little in common. Thus, I do not offer them as
examples of “arbitration” writ large, or to suggest an equivalence
among them. To the contrary, their differences help to illustrate an
important fact: that each system of arbitration represents a unique
institutional context, the particulars of which undoubtedly will
influence how (and whether) arbitral precedent evolves. Despite the
differences among these systems of arbitration, however, I hope to
show that a core set of considerations can shed light on the role
arbitral precedent plays in each.

33. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 5, at 8; Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of
Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1459, 1489 (1996); Carbonneau, supra note 2, at
1205; Drahozal, supra note 20, at 213; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1613 (2005); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX.
L. REV. 485, 535 (1997); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated
Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 683 (2008); Ware, supra note 16, at 746-47.
34. See Bruce, supra note 5, at 9; Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129 (2007);
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and Investment Arbitration: A
Citation Analysis, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., at 3, May 2008 (on file with author; also available
with subscription at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com); Christopher S.
Gibson & Christopher R. Drahozal, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Precedent in InvestorState Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 521 (2006); see also Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1204-05
(referring to the precedential value of awards of the Court of Sports Arbitration and the
International Chamber of Commerce); Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1014, 1016 (2007) (“[T]here is an informal, but
powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published
awards and to stabilize international investment law.”); Drahozal, supra note 20, at 213
(summarizing evidence); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator,
20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 999-1000 (2005) (noting that even though confidential and lacking
a doctrine of stare decisis, international arbitrations “generate procedural rules and practices,
and to a lesser extent substantive rules,” and giving examples).
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B. The Creation of Arbitral Precedent: Three Case Studies
1. ICSID as an Evolved System of International Investment
Law
The use of arbitration to resolve disputes between states and
foreign investors has a lengthy history.35 Most early investment
arbitrations were conducted pursuant to bilateral treaties that
created tribunals empowered to adjudicate existing disputes
involving foreign nationals.36 But absent such a treaty between the
investor’s home state and the host or borrower state, disappointed
investors often had little recourse.37
ICSID’s major innovation was to create a formal mechanism for
resolving investment disputes, one in which foreign investors assert
claims directly against states.38 Although there is probably no such
thing as a “typical” investment dispute, consider claims asserted by
a foreign oil company arising out of a sovereign state’s cancelation
of the company’s contract to extract oil from the sovereign’s territory.39 The ICSID Convention itself does not create an obligation to
arbitrate such disputes.40 States must consent to arbitration, either
in particular contracts or by consenting generally to arbitration in
a statute or treaty.41 In our example dispute, ICSID jurisdiction
might be founded on an arbitration clause in a bilateral investment
treaty between the investor’s home state and the host country.42
35. On this history, see GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW 18 & n.36 (2007).
36. See FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER 25-26 (1999); VAN
HARTEN, supra note 35, at 18 & n.36.
37. EDWIN BORCHARD, 1 STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 171 (1951).
38. See Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Foreword to CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, at xi (2001); VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 6; Franck, supra
note 33, at 1529.
39. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11,
Decision on Provisional Measures ¶¶ 6-19 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending
(scroll down to number 49; then follow “Decision on Provision Measures” hyperlink).
40. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, pmbl., opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
41. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 24.
42. See Occidental Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 2. Unlike the historic

1908

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1895

Such arbitrations are “typically governed by international law,
whether that law takes the form of treaty terms or customary
international law as incorporated by the treaty.”43
At least from the perspective of capital-exporting states, ICSID
was a pragmatic, procedural solution to a long-standing concern: the
failure to reach multilateral agreement on substantive standards
of investor protection.44 But ICSID was not consciously designed to
create a body of investment law precedent. There is no doctrine of
stare decisis in investment or any other kind of arbitration.45 Yet
despite the formally nonbinding nature of past awards, ICSID
tribunals frequently cite to and engage with awards issued by
investment or other international tribunals. In an analysis of ICSID
awards issued between 1990 and 2006, Jeffery Commission found
that tribunals cited to awards rendered by other ICSID panels
nearly 80 percent of the time.46 Commission also found that, over
that time period, ICSID panels grew increasingly likely to cite prior
awards and that the number of such citations per award increased.47
Through this engagement with past awards, ICSID tribunals have
gradually fashioned what has been called an investment treaty
“case law or jurisprudence.”48
treaties referenced above, modern bilateral investment treaties often include the sovereign’s
general submission to arbitration of future disputes.
43. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 175 (2007).
44. See Lauterpacht, supra note 38, at xi; VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 6.
45. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 39 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (scroll down to number
13; then follow “Decision on Jurisdiction” hyperlink); Rogers, supra note 34, at 999. Indeed,
Article 53(1) of the Convention provides that awards “shall be binding on the parties,” perhaps
implicitly suggesting that awards are not binding on those who are not parties, or even on the
same parties when future disputes arise. ICSID Convention, supra note 40, art. 53(1), 17
U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194; see also SCHREUER, supra note 38, at 1082; Christoph H.
Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases—Is There a Doctrine of Precedent
in Investment Arbitration?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., May 2008 (on file with author; also
available with subscription at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com).
46. Commission, supra note 34, at 149-50 & tbls.3, 4 & 5 (reporting that 77.7 percent of
tribunals cited to at least one other case).
47. Id.; see also Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 538-44 (finding that ICSID awards
frequently cite to precedents of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal examining citation
practices).
48. Commission, supra note 34, at 130. This development has attracted a great deal of
attention from scholars, lawyers, and arbitrators involved in international arbitration. See
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2. International Commercial Arbitration’s Weaker System of
Precedent
Unlike international investment arbitration, which involves disputes between states and foreign investors, international commercial arbitration generally refers to “nonspecialized arbitration
between private parties involved in international commercial
transactions.”49 As an example, consider a dispute between a U.S.
importer and its purchasing agent in Hong Kong arising out of the
importer’s refusal to pay sales commissions.50 Although parties may
contract for the application of transnational commercial law, the
limited empirical evidence suggests that national law governs most
commercial arbitrations.51
As with investment arbitration, international commercial arbitration awards sometimes cite to and engage with other awards.52
Yet the existing evidence, although quite limited, suggests that
international commercial arbitration features a much less robust
system of arbitral precedent than investment arbitration. For
example, in a survey of awards interpreting the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265 (Colin B.
Picker et al. eds., 2008); Commission, supra note 34, at 149-50; see also Cheng, supra note 34,
at 1030-44 (reviewing use of precedent in investment arbitration); Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 368-73 (2007). See
generally Special Issue, Precedent in Investment Arbitration, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., May
2008, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com.samples/toc.asp?key=24.
Other studies of the citation practices of international arbitration tribunals have echoed
these findings. For example, in a previous study focusing on citation by ICSID panels to
awards rendered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Professors Christopher Gibson
and Christopher Drahozal found that nearly 45 percent of merits awards rendered between
1986 and 2006 cited to Tribunal awards. Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 539-40; see also
Drahozal, supra note 20, at 6. Likewise, in a survey of awards published by the Court of
Arbitration for Sports, Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler found a “strong evolution
towards reliance on other sports law cases,” with citations becoming increasingly frequent
over time. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra at 365; see also Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1204-05
(referencing sports arbitration precedent).
49. Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the
New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 530 (2005).
50. See Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 1999).
51. See Drahozal, supra note 49, at 536-45.
52. See, e.g., Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, 9 Y.B. Com. Arb. 131, 136-37 (Int’l Ct.
of Arb. 1984).
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Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler found that only 6 of 100
awards cited to other awards.53 A separate survey of International
Chamber of Commerce awards found that about 15 percent cited
past awards, mostly on questions of jurisdiction and procedure.54
3. An Example from the United States: Labor Arbitration
Labor arbitrators, of course, adjudicate disputes between an
employer and the union representing its employees. The arbitrator’s
authority derives from the arbitration clause contained in the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and the
employer.55 Most CBAs require “cause” or “just cause” for any disciplinary action,56 and most labor arbitrations feature an employee
challenging the employer’s action under that standard. These are
contract disputes,57 but of a somewhat unique sort. In most contracts, but for the arbitration clause, claims for breach of contract
would be litigated in court.58 In that sense, arbitration serves as a
substitute for litigation.59 By contrast, the traditional understanding
of labor arbitration is that the CBA represents a bargain in which
the union limits its right to strike in exchange for the employer’s
agreement to replace its traditional discretion over discipline and
discharge decisions with arbitration under a “just cause” standard.60
Because the CBA grants unionized employees protection from
discipline and discharge not enjoyed by most nonunionized employees, this bargain—“no strikes in exchange for arbitration of grievances”61—means that most grievance arbitrations “involve[ ] claims

53. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 362.
54. Id. For an explanation of why such a difference might exist between international
commercial and investment arbitration, see id. at 368-73.
55. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
56. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7-12 (14th ed. 1995).
57. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 106 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th
ed. 2003).
58. See STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 108 (2001).
59. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
60. See id. at 578 (noting that, in the union context, arbitration is not a substitute for
litigation, but a “substitute for industrial strife”); WARE, supra note 58, at 107-09.
61. WARE, supra note 58, at 108.
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that would not have been asserted in litigation had the parties not
agreed to arbitrate.”62
Although labor arbitration otherwise has little in common with
international investment arbitration, each system appears to have
produced a fairly robust system of arbitral precedent. Labor arbitration scholars and industry professionals widely believe that labor
arbitrators treat past awards as legitimate sources of authority63
and as building blocks in a “common law of the workplace.”64
Surveys of labor arbitrators,65 reports of cases in which arbitrators
have relied on prior awards,66 and a modest body of empirical
evidence all support this belief.67
4. Precedent’s Role Across Different Systems of Arbitration
ICSID, international commercial, and labor arbitration are not
the only arbitration systems in which some form of precedent has
evolved.68 Some maritime arbitrators, for example, take prior
awards into consideration,69 and it appears that the same is true in

62. Id. at 109. Some empirical support for this comes from the fact that most CBAs
require both arbitration and “cause” or “just cause” for discipline or discharge decisions. See
BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 56, at 7-12; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 57, at 93132.
63. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 57, at 567-603; ARNOLD M. ZACK &
RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 61 (2d ed. 1995).
64. See generally THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS
(Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 2d ed. 2005).
65. See Edgar L. Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 4 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 200, 216 (1951).
66. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 57, at 589 & n. 84.
67. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 5, at 9-10; Phillip Harris, The Use of Precedent in Labor
Arbitration, 32 ARB. J. 26, 28-34 (1977); Ken Jennings & Cindy Martin, The Role of Prior
Arbitration Awards in Arbitral Decisions, 29 LAB. L.J. 95 (1978).
68. It bears repeating that the practice of citing past awards does not provide the only
evidence of arbitral precedent. As mentioned earlier, a system might be precedential if
knowledge of past decisions influence arbitrators’ rulings, or if parties structure their
behavior around rules announced in past awards. The existing evidence, however, focuses
primarily on citation practices.
69. See, e.g., Robert Force & Anthony J. Mavronicolas, Two Models of Maritime Dispute
Resolution: Litigation and Arbitration, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1503 (1991) (providing some
evidence); Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Publications, http://www.smany.org/sma/smapubs.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (noting that although not bound by precedent, New York
arbitrators take prior awards into consideration).
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class arbitration.70 At one level, it should be no surprise that such
a diverse array of arbitration systems have generated some form of
precedent. Assume, for example, that members of a trade association want to have disputes resolved according to a set of trade rules
rather than state-supplied law.71 Because arbitrators can be chosen
for their diligence, acumen, or industry expertise, association members might prefer arbitration to litigation.72 Assume further that
members want their arbitration system to produce rulings that bind
future arbitrators, perhaps because they believe this will lend certainty to future transactions and facilitate dispute settlement. To
accomplish these goals, the arbitration contract might require arbitrators to set forth the reasoning underlying their awards and even
to follow precedent established in prior arbitrations.73 Structured in
this manner, an arbitration system might produce “a sophisticated,
comprehensive [and private] legal system.”74
But most users of arbitration do not consciously seek to create a
system of private legal rules.75 Certainly that is true of ICSID, international commercial, and labor arbitration.76 Nevertheless, past
awards receive precedential weight in each system. Indeed, at first
glance, this appears to be one of the few things the three systems
70. See Stacie I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due
Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (2008); W. Mark C. Weidemaier,
Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 103-04 (2007).
71. See Ware, supra note 16, at 745-46.
72. See id. For examples involving the cotton and diamond industries, see Bernstein,
supra note 8; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Barak D.
Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond
Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006).
73. Ware, supra note 16, at 746-47.
74. Id. at 747. For a general discussion of the relative merits of privately versus publicly
produced corporate law, see Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private
Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414 (2006).
75. This is true even of trade groups that expect arbitrators to resolve disputes according
to trade custom and usage. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 8, at 124-27 (describing DDC
proceedings, which are kept secret and generally do not produce reasoned awards).
76. It is perhaps inaccurate to refer to ICSID as a system that generates “private” legal
rules. Although founded on the private model of international commercial arbitration, ICSID
tribunals resolve disputes that raise important regulatory questions that some believe are
better entrusted to courts and other public actors. See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at
50-71. Precisely because it is modeled on international commercial arbitration, however,
ICSID offers instructive lessons on the evolution of arbitration precedent in more truly
“private” disputing systems.
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have in common. International investment disputes in particular
are distinct because these involve claims by private parties challenging a sovereign state’s use of its regulatory authority, disputes
more quintessentially “public” in nature than those typically heard
in the other systems.
I do not mean to overstate the difference between “public”
international tribunals—or quasi-public tribunals like ICSID—and
“private” commercial tribunals.77 But as a general proposition,
investment disputes differ from international commercial disputes
(and, for that matter, labor disputes) in at least two ways. First,
investment disputes are more likely to implicate state regulatory
interests in a fairly direct fashion.78 Second, because one of the
disputants is a sovereign state, investors are less able to rely on
formal legal enforcement tools and must rely more on extralegal
means of enforcement.79 By and large, states comply with ICSID
awards not because they are compelled to do so but to avoid the
reputational or other extralegal costs associated with noncompliance.80
77. For example, there is substantial overlap in the claims, structure, and experiences of
various international tribunals. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 11 (1992).
78. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at vii.
79. See Bjorklund, supra note 48, at 277. On the difficulty of enforcing judgments against
sovereign states, see, for example, Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or
Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1086
(2004). It is true that formal law facilitates the enforcement of international arbitration
awards, including those rendered by ICSID tribunals; in some contexts, however, it is doubtful
this law has much practical significance. Compare Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a
Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 358-65 (2006)
(explaining ICSID’s benefits and suggesting that these benefits are substantial in the context
of defaulted sovereign debt), with W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1, 20-23 (2009) (disputing the practical significance of these enforcement benefits in
the sovereign debt context). Despite arbitration’s formal enforcement advantages, see 28
U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (2006) (eliminating the requirement in § 1610(a)(2) of a nexus between the
sovereign’s commercial property located in the United States and the “commercial activity
upon which the claim was based,” but only in cases of arbitration), it remains difficult to find
and seize sovereign assets that are not immune from execution, for “defaulting sovereigns try
their best not to leave valuables lying around.” William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati,
Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004)
(referring to the sovereign debt context).
80. To a degree, of course, this is true in international commercial and labor disputes as
well. But given the difficulty of obtaining and enforcing a judgment against a sovereign state,
compliance is less likely to be driven by fear of coercive enforcement.
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That each of these very different systems of arbitration has
generated some form of precedent illustrates the wide range of
contexts in which arbitral precedent may evolve. Moreover, despite
their differences, each system illustrates a broader consideration
relevant to the evolution of precedent in arbitration. The following
discussion explores three such considerations, beginning with the
question whether the arbitration system is structurally conducive
to the creation of precedent.
II. CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRAL
PRECEDENT
A. Structural Characteristics as Necessary (Even Sufficient?)
Conditions of Precedent
Many arbitration systems are structurally incompatible with
the creation of precedent. For example, many do not require that
arbitrators write reasoned awards—that is, those that offer an
explanation for the result reached.81 Nor are these awards accessible
to the public or even to system users other than the disputants and
their lawyers.82 Participants in such systems are unlikely to learn
of relevant past awards and will find any they do encounter inscrutable. Unreasoned awards do not find facts, state conclusions of law,
offer reasons, or provide any information relevant to future disputes
beyond certain basic facts: a dispute happened, it involved parties
A and B, and party A won. It is hard to imagine how such an award
could guide future conduct, shape lawyers’ arguments, or provide a
justification for a future award.83
ICSID and labor arbitration depart radically from this model, and
international commercial arbitration departs to a lesser degree.
ICSID tribunals issue reasoned awards that explain the result
81. See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 29, at 1082-83. As I noted previously, some form of
precedent is possible notwithstanding the lack of reasoned awards. See supra text
accompanying note 8. Because I am interested in observable manifestations of precedent,
however, reasoned awards play a more important role.
82. Alderman, supra note 18, at 11; Perschbacher & Basset, supra note 16, at 30.
83. See Koruga v. Ming Wang, Case No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559 (N.A.S.D.) at *11-12
(2001) (Meyer, Jones & Dunnington, Arbs.) (discounting the precedential value of prior
awards “in which no significant legal precedent is discussed or reasoning given”).
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reached and the tribunal’s reasoning in great detail.84 Most of these
awards are published.85 The public can access them free of charge
on ICSID’s website,86 and ICSID Reports also compiles and digests
many more awards. Likewise, labor arbitrators often issue reasoned
awards,87 and these are of great interest to unions, employers, and
their lawyers. Legal publishers like the Bureau of National Affairs
have selectively published labor arbitration awards for many
decades,88 and reference texts attempt to distill the rulings of labor
arbitrators into a coherent set of principles to guide future disputes.89 By contrast, although international commercial arbitrations
commonly result in a reasoned award,90 relatively few of these are
published.91 Thus, a simplistic (if partial) explanation for the
apparently weaker body of international commercial arbitration
precedent might emphasize the relatively low rate of award
publication.
This explanation squares well with the existing literature on
arbitral precedent, which draws a direct link between reasoned,
published awards and arbitral precedent. Indeed, the literature
suggests that the use of reasoned, published awards is a necessary,
and perhaps even a sufficient, condition for arbitral precedent to
evolve.92 Yet this common understanding requires both elaboration
84. See ICSID Convention, supra note 40, art. 52(1)(e), 17 U.S.T. at 1290, 575 U.N.T.S.
at 192.
85. Although ICSID itself does not publish awards without consent, parties frequently
grant consent, and even when that does not happen one party may unilaterally publish the
award. See id. art. 48(5), 17 U.S.T. at 1288, 575 U.N.T.S. at 188; RUDOLF DOLZERT &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 261-62 (2008); Cheng,
supra note 34, at 1015.
86. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/Index.jsp (follow “Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
87. See Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1, 58-59 (2006).
88. The Bureau of National Affairs began publishing labor arbitration awards in 1942. See
120 LAB. ARB. REP. (BNA), at vii (2008).
89. See generally COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE, supra note 64.
90. See William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803, 823
(2002).
91. See Drahozal, supra note 34, at 542.
92. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 20, at 214 (“[T]he available evidence suggests that some
system of precedent is likely to develop when arbitration awards are published.”); Fabien
Gélinas, Investment Tribunals and the Commercial Arbitration Model: Mixed Procedures and
Creeping Institutionalisation, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD TRADE LAW 577, 585
(Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger eds., 2005) (asserting that the “only
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and qualification. In the following discussion, I first identify the
functions served by reasoned awards and explain why they are
much more common features of arbitration than is often supposed.
I then explain why arbitral precedent is likely to depend on award
accessibility, rather than award publication. Finally, I flesh out the
argument—implicit in some of the arbitration literature93—that the
use of reasoned, accessible awards necessarily will result in a
system of arbitral precedent. Although I view this argument as
plausible, it is no more than that. As I will explain later, whether
arbitrators generate precedent likely depends on other considerations as well.
1. The Surprisingly Common Use of Reasoned Awards
Although not all arbitration systems require reasoned awards,
many do. At first glance, this is a bit puzzling. After all, arbitrators
must be paid to write them, and parties may not wish to bear the
cost, especially because any resulting precedent confers an uncompensated benefit on other parties.94 The puzzle disappears, however,
when we recognize that reasoned awards serve important functions

conceivable way of preventing a body of case law from developing in investment arbitration
would have involved a total ban on publication”). On the importance of reasoned, published
awards, the link between such awards, and the creation of arbitral precedent, see, for
example, Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 459, 473 (2008); Brunet, supra note 33, at 1489; Thomas E.
Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: the Elaboration of a Common Law of
International Transactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 579, 605 (1985); Cheng, supra note
34, at 1025; Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State
Disputes—Adaptation, Adoption, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1356
(2006); Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice?, 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 762 (2001);
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Private Law, Public “Justice”: Another Look at Privacy, Arbitration
and Global E-Commerce, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 769, 772-73 (2000); William W. Park,
The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1241, 1267-68 (2003); W. Michael Reisman, Law, International Public Policy (So-called) and
Arbitral Choice in International Commercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
2006: BACK TO BASICS? 849, 854-56 & n.3 (van den Berg ed., 2007); Jacob H. Zamansky, A
“Reasoned” Arbitration Decision?: Be Careful What You Ask For, in 2 SECURITIES ARBITRATION
2005: TELLING YOUR STORY 335, 341 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B-1503, 2005).
93. See supra note 92.
94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 238-39; Luban, supra note 13, at 2622.
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and that parties often are willing to pay for them for reasons having
nothing to do with the desire to establish a system of precedent.
Reasoned decisions, whether issued by judges or arbitrators,
provide benefits to three groups: disputants, adjudicators, and third
parties. For disputants, reasoned decisions provide an explanation
that can be used to guide future conduct and a sense, perhaps
especially important to the losing party, that the adjudicatory
process was a deliberate and fair one.95 Reasoned awards also may
facilitate judicial review of the award; despite the limited statutory
grounds for vacatur, a petition to vacate the award would be
virtually impossible without a reasoned award.96 Adjudicators also
may benefit from their production of reasoned decisions, for these
may confer prestige with lawyers, future disputants, other adjudicators, and the public at large.97 Finally, reasoned decisions may
benefit a wide range of third parties, including potential future
disputants, legislators, voters, and others. Reasoned decisions serve
multiple functions for these important constituencies—facilitating
private ordering,98 guiding future lawmaking efforts,99 and providing
some assurance that the dispute resolution system meets externally
imposed standards of legitimacy.100
The legitimizing function of reasoned awards bears special
mention in arbitration. Above all else, the arbitrator must produce
95. See, e.g., Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 402 (1995); Robert A.
Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 814 (1961);
Richard Mittenthal & Howard S. Block, The Ever-Present Role of Arbitral Discretion, in LABOR
ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 231, 251-52 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997); Rau,
supra note 33, at 531; Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 658 (1995).
96. On the relationship between judicial standards for vacatur and reasoned awards, see
Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443 (1998).
97. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107, 129 (1983); Anthony D’Amato, Judicial Legislation, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 63, 67 (1979);
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2029 (1994); Earl M. Maltz,
The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (2000).
98. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1202 (2000).
99. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1998).
100. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 973-74 (2000); Dorf, supra
note 97, at 2029.
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an award that is enforceable; the parties are hardly likely to
appreciate financing a dispute resolution process that does not, in
fact, resolve their dispute. One benefit of reasoned awards is that
losing parties may be more inclined to view them as legitimate and
thus to comply voluntarily. To that end, a “careful demonstration
that the decisionmaker has listened and responded to” the losing
party’s arguments may enhance the prospects of voluntary compliance.101
When voluntary compliance is not forthcoming, the winning party
may seek to enforce the award through formal legal means. In
arbitration, this means asking a judge to “confirm” the award—that
is, convert it into a court judgment.102 Although judges do not review
awards on the merits, the stringency of the review is likely to
depend, in part, on whether the judge believes that the award
resulted from a fair process.103 Here, a reasoned award may signal
that the arbitrator made the decision and conducted the arbitration
itself in a deliberate, unbiased way.
In some cases, of course, it may be difficult or impossible to
enforce an award through formal legal means. International investment disputes fall into this category given the difficulty of enforcing
judgments against sovereign states.104 As noted previously, states
comply with ICSID awards primarily to avoid the reputational and
other costs associated with noncompliance.105 For example, a state
might pay an award to preserve its reputation as a reliable transaction partner with future investors. Whether the reputational costs
of noncompliance provide a substantial inducement to pay depends
in part on whether parties in a position to impose these costs—
perhaps including investors, international financial institutions,
and even the borrower’s own citizens—perceive the award and the
101. Rau, supra note 33, at 535.
102. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 207 (2006); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1126-27 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining process for
enforcing arbitral award when the losing party does not comply).
103. Standards of review differ across domestic and international contexts. To the extent
there is a common principle (especially in the United States), it is that judicial review seeks
to ensure that “the arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his agency and was not biased in
some way.” Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its Implications for
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
104. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
105. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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arbitration process that produced it as legitimate.106 In this context,
then, one function of a reasoned award is to legitimize the arbitration process in the eyes of these diverse external constituents.
Finally, it bears repeating that arbitrators often operate in a
competitive market in which future purchasers will choose an
arbitrator based on perceptions about the arbitrator’s diligence,
expertise, and impartiality.107 Reasoned awards can communicate
that the arbitrator possesses these qualities and therefore enhance
the arbitrator’s legitimacy to future purchasers of arbitration
services.108 Thus, a central feature of reasoned awards is that they
serve to legitimize both the arbitrator (in general) and the arbitration (in particular) in the eyes of a number of important constituencies: the disputants themselves, external actors who may play a role
in enforcing the award, and future purchasers of the arbitrator’s
services.
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that reasoned
awards will be a relatively common, if not ubiquitous, feature of
arbitration.109 For arbitrators, reasoned awards may serve as a form
of advertising; an award that demonstrates competence, neutrality,
or expertise may enhance the value of the arbitrator’s services.110
Parties might fund this practice because it generates information
106. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26
(1995) (noting link between perceived legitimacy and voluntary compliance); Cheng, supra
note 34, at 1026 (noting that investment arbitration’s long-term viability depends on the
extent to which “investors, States, observers, scholars, and lawyers” perceive it to be
legitimate).
107. See Rutledge, supra note 19, at 164-65, 170. In some contexts, of course, arbitrators
may seek to develop a reputation as “friendly” to a particular class of litigant. See id. at 165
& 170 n.77.
108. See Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 239; Rau, supra note 33, at 532-33; Schmitz,
supra note 33, at 683. Public judges may have similar communicative objectives, though to
a lesser degree, when they draft opinions and take other official acts. See, e.g., LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 15-24 (2005) (arguing that competition for large cases altered
bankruptcy court practices); Cooter, supra note 97, at 129 (noting that life-tenured federal
judges may seek prestige “by acting in such a way that they would be chosen to decide cases
by litigants and their lawyers if choice were allowed”).
109. There are, of course, reasons not to have a reasoned award. Parties who wish to
minimize the cost of arbitration or to avoid judicial scrutiny, for example, may elect to forego
a reasoned award.
110. See Bruce, supra note 5, at 7-8; Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 239; Peter Seitz,
The Citation of Authority and Precedent in Arbitration (Its Use and Abuse), ARB. J., Dec. 1983,
at 58, 60.
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about the arbitrator that can be used to improve future selection
decisions. Parties might also pay for reasoned awards because they
believe that arbitrators who must provide a written explanation are
less likely to make careless or biased decisions.111 Or they might pay
for reasoned awards because they believe such awards enable
judicial review or increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance,
the effectiveness of formal enforcement, or both.
Finally, and perhaps counterintuitively, parties may pay arbitrators to produce reasoned awards even when they do not want
them. This is because public actors sometimes mandate the use of
reasoned awards. For instance, in cases involving statutory rights,
some U.S. courts will not enforce an arbitration agreement that does
not provide for a reasoned award.112 Parties may, of course, elect not
to use arbitration in such cases. Yet they may continue to use it if
arbitration offers net benefits relative to other dispute resolution
options.113 For all of these reasons, arbitration systems both within
and outside of the United States commonly feature reasoned
awards.114
2. Accessibility, Not Publication
Of course, no system of precedent is likely to arise unless arbitrators become aware of relevant past awards, either through their
own research or, more commonly, because the litigants cite past
awards as authority.115 This explains the arbitration literature’s
111. See, e.g., Rau, supra note 33, at 530-32 (doubting the efficacy of the requirement);
Schauer, supra note 95, at 657.
112. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 685 (Cal. 2000).
113. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 551-54 (2003).
114. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 84-87 (ICSID), 87-89 (labor), 90-91
(international commercial arbitration); see also EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES R. 39C (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32904#39;
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS R. 10 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936; JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES R. 24(h) (Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Servs., Inc. 2009), http://www.
jamsadr.com/rules-employment-arbitration/.
115. In some contexts, it may be controversial for the arbitrator to conduct independent
legal research, especially when the claim is not based on mandatory law. See, e.g., CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES § 2(G),
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emphasis on the importance of award publication.116 The practice of
publishing awards—often in searchable form— significantly reduces
the cost to litigants of such research, making it feasible even in
relatively low-stakes disputes.
As I have noted, however, the focus on award publication may be
misguided. One benefit of publication is that published awards are
accessible to third parties with limited (or no) familiarity with the
system. For example, because awards issued pursuant to the
American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) employment rules are
available in searchable form on LexisNexis, a lawyer who has not
previously arbitrated a case before an AAA arbitrator, but who has
access to LexisNexis, can quickly search for relevant past awards,
including those issued by prospective arbitrators.117 Without publication, such relative outsiders are unlikely to locate relevant
awards.
For reasons that should be fairly obvious, this does not mean that
arbitral precedent depends on award publication. What matters is
that system participants have access to past awards and assign
value to them as precedent. Even when awards are not published,
for example, arbitrators are often repeat players and may be well
aware of how they and other arbitrators have resolved similar
disputes.118 This suggests that arbitral precedent may evolve more
readily in systems in which relatively few arbitrators capture a
large share of the arbitration business. Repeat player litigants and
law firms likewise accumulate knowledge of prior disputes and may
invoke past awards that favor their current positions.119
For these reasons, it also follows that publication alone does not
ensure that awards will be accessible to all system users. In some
contexts, for example, awards may be published in dispersed,
specialized reporters and databases that will be unfamiliar to less

cmt. a (Nat’l Acad. of Arbitrators, as amended Sept. 2007), http://www.naarb.org/code.html
(stating that the propriety of such research depends “primarily on the policies of the parties”).
116. See supra note 92.
117. The AAA does, however, redact the names of parties and witnesses from these awards,
somewhat limiting the utility of publication.
118. See Gélinas, supra note 92, at 585 n.24.
119. See Carbonneau, supra note 92, at 607-08; Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1319 (2006).
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experienced parties and lawyers.120 In others, newcomers may be
unaware of system norms concerning how legal arguments should
be presented, including such basic knowledge as what constitutes
“authority” within the system.121 These knowledge gaps have
obvious and important implications for the substance of arbitral
precedent, for information asymmetries between disputants may
shape the content of privately made law.122 Because I am concerned
in this Article with the existence of arbitral precedent and not its
content, I do not dwell on this point further.
Thus refined to emphasize accessibility rather than publication,
the existing literature on arbitral precedent comfortably accommodates the empirical evidence from international investment, labor,
and international commercial arbitration. Each system features
reasoned awards. ICSID and labor arbitration awards are often published and many are available in searchable form through online
databases.123 More importantly, these awards are readily accessible
to system participants. This is especially so in international investment arbitration, in which a relative handful of international
arbitrators and lawyers—already an elite group—may capture a significant percentage of the arbitration business.124
By contrast, the lower rate of award citation in international
commercial arbitration may be due, at least in part, to the fact that
120. See, e.g., Stacie I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special
Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-5, 11-12,
on file with author).
121. See id. (manuscript at 4-6) (discussing this issue in the context of international
commercial arbitration).
122. See Gibbons, supra note 92, at 772-73.
123. Westlaw’s ICSID-AWARDS database contains ICSID awards published in
International Legal Materials from 1982. The LRR-LA database contains labor arbitration
awards published in BNA’s Labor Arbitration Reports. LA-UNP contains awards submitted
to BNA but not published in Labor Arbitration Reports.
124. See Commission, supra note 34, at 138-39 (finding that 21.3 percent of the arbitrators
accounted for 49 percent of the possible appointments in concluded ICSID, and that 23.4
percent of the arbitrators accounted for 54 percent of the appointments in pending cases).
Given such concentration, arbitrators are likely to be familiar with past awards (and, of
course, may have rendered many awards themselves). See Rogers, supra note 34, at 1000-01.
For evidence on the lesser degree of concentration in the market for labor arbitrators’ services,
see Charles J. Coleman, The Arbitrator’s Cases: Number, Sources, Issues, and Implications,
in LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA: THE PROFESSION AND PRACTICE 88-90 & tbl.5.2, fig.5.1
(Mario F. Bognanno & Charles J. Coleman eds., 1992) [hereinafter LABOR ARBITRATION IN
AMERICA].
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many system participants have limited access to past awards.
Relatively few commercial arbitration awards are published, and
those that are sometimes appear only in specialized sources.125 This
may not have mattered much when the market for international
commercial arbitrators and lawyers was highly concentrated. At
least until recently, international commercial arbitration was
dominated by an elite, relatively homogenous group of lawyers and
arbitrators.126 These repeat players accumulated knowledge of past
arbitrations and “knew how to research and present arguments” in
accordance with governing norms.127 Gradually, however, the market for international arbitration and legal services has expanded
(along with arbitration caseloads) to the point that many participants will be unaware of the vast majority of potentially relevant
awards. Under such circumstances, the lack of widespread award
publication may hinder the development of precedent.
3. Might Reasoned, Accessible Awards Be Enough?
It is easy to see how a system of arbitral precedent might require
the use of reasoned, accessible awards.128 At times, however, the
arbitration literature goes further, suggesting that arbitration
systems featuring these attributes necessarily will produce some
form of precedent.129 As I have mentioned, I am skeptical of this
possibility.130 For now, however, I defer this skepticism and devote
the following discussion to the possibility that arbitration systems
featuring reasoned, accessible awards intrinsically generate precedent.
It may help to begin with an example. Consider an investment
arbitration in which the relevant bilateral treaty requires the host
government to treat foreign investments in a “fair and equitable”
125. See Strong, supra note 120 (manuscript at 4-5).
126. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE 18-29, 34-62
(1996) (describing characteristics and evolution of the market for international commercial
arbitration services); Alan S. Rau, The Arbitrator and “Mandatory Rules of Law,” 18 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 51, 88 (2007) (noting that the elite lawyer or law professor is “the typical member
of an international arbitral tribunal”).
127. Strong, supra note 120 (manuscript at 4-5).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
129. See supra note 92.
130. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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manner.131 Assume that an earlier panel of arbitrators has defined
this fair and equitable treatment standard to forbid conduct
amounting to “wilful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action
falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad
faith.”132 Because ICSID awards are readily accessible to system
participants, it is likely that the arbitrators in the present dispute
will be familiar with this definition and that one party or the other
will ask them to adopt it. Under what circumstances are the
arbitrators likely to do so?
One possibility is that the arbitrators will adopt the first panel’s
definition because the parties to the present dispute instruct them
to do so.133 But since disputants are unlikely to agree on the
definition ex post, these cases are likely to be rare. A second
possibility—to which I have already alluded134—is that the arbitrators will adopt the prior panel’s definition because they believe most
system users prefer it to other possible definitions. When such a
preference exists, arbitrators who refuse to honor it will, all else
equal, soon find themselves out of work.135 We might expect,
therefore, that arbitrators will tend to follow widely adopted rules
or rules announced by especially prominent arbitrators, viewing
these as proxies for the general preferences of system users.136
In many cases, however, system users will have divergent
preferences, or arbitrators will lack the information necessary to

131. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1234
(2005). Most investment treaties are thought to contain a similar invocation of the fair and
equitable treatment standard, which, “broadly speaking, obliges host States to treat foreign
investments in an even-handed manner.” Cheng, supra note 34, at 1031.
132. See Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award ¶ 367 (June 25, 2001),
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/Index.jsp (search “Genin”; then follow “ICSID Case No.
ARB/99/2” hyperlink; then follow “Decisions & Awards” tab; then follow “Award of the
Tribunal” hyperlink).
133. Parties are generally free to choose the law applicable to their dispute. See, e.g., ICSID
CONVENTION, supra note 40, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. at 186.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
135. See Bruce, supra note 5, at 8.
136. This corresponds to the belief that awards issued by prominent, “highly respected”
arbitrators are more worthy of publication. See Seitz, supra note 110, at 60. This belief may
be stated as a preference for quality; perhaps only the most “skilled, insightful, and
percipient” arbitrators become well known and respected. Id. But to the extent prominence
derives from an arbitrator’s frequent selection, it also serves as a proxy for system users’
satisfaction with the substance of the arbitrator’s awards.
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determine the relevant preference. Thus, the arbitrators in our
example dispute may have a fair amount of discretion to define the
obligation of “fair and equitable treatment.” Notwithstanding that
discretion, there are a number of reasons why the arbitrators might
adopt the prior panel’s definition.
One possibility, commonly invoked in the arbitration literature,
is that arbitrators will adopt those awards they believe to have been
correctly decided.137 For example, if the panelists believe the fair
and equitable treatment standard should work to ensure a stable
and predictable investment environment,138 they might reject the
earlier panel’s definition in favor of one they deem better suited to
that purpose.139 The implication is that a coherent, consistent body
of precedent will arise over time as arbitrators reach consensus as
to the best, most “persuasive” definition.140 In this sense, reasoned,
accessible awards may yield a system of arbitral precedent by provoking a process of reflection, deliberation, and consensus building
among arbitrators.
Note that this vision of arbitral precedent is a limited one. At
least as the term is understood by most lawyers, precedent constrains the discretion of future decision makers to some meaningful
degree.141 Yet if arbitrators follow only those awards they deem
correct, prior awards may not serve as any constraint at all.142 As I
have already noted, however, I do not view constraint as a necessary

137. See, e.g., Commission, supra note 34, at 155-56; Seitz, supra note 110, at 59.
138. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1235 (2005).
139. See id. at 1236 (interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard as “an objective
requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or bad
faith in adopting the measures in question”).
140. Gélinas, supra note 92, at 583; Thomas W. Wälde, The Specific Nature of Investment
Arbitration, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 43, 47 (Philippe Kahn &
Thomas W. Wälde eds., 2007).
141. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989-1990);
Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 525; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571,
575-76 (1987). Many political scientists, of course, would dispute that precedent serves to
constrain judicial decision making. See supra note 5.
142. This is not to say past awards have no relevance to future disputes. For example, an
award that adopts rule X may increase the salience of that rule and thus increase the
likelihood that a future arbitrator will adopt it over a potentially competing rule. Relatedly,
a panel’s adoption of rule X may provide a focal point around which system users (and future
arbitrators) can structure legal arguments and future behavior. On the ability of adjudication
to serve this function generally, see McAdams, supra note 6, at 1059-64.
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feature of arbitral (or for that matter judicial) precedent.143 Whether
or not awards constrain future arbitrators, we can plausibly refer to
a system of arbitral precedent if awards shape the manner in which
lawyers frame their arguments, the language in which arbitrators
justify their decisions, and the behavior of system users.
It is at least possible, however, that awards may constrain future
arbitrators in some meaningful sense.144 To take an example from
labor arbitration, consider the “work first, grieve later” rule, under
which employees may be disciplined for refusing to follow direct
orders notwithstanding a legitimate dispute as to whether the order
is permitted under the CBA.145 Although the rule is hardly certain
in its application, many arbitrators have come to view it as a fixture
of labor arbitration law.146 One reason for this, no doubt, is widespread agreement that the rule serves an important purpose: “If an
employee is permitted to willfully disregard a direct order it would
result in chaos in the work place.”147 Yet arbitrators may also adhere
to the rule because they believe that doing so is necessary to afford
equal treatment to similarly situated litigants.148 Or they might
adhere to the rule in the belief that employers have justifiably relied
on the rule in making disciplinary decisions, so that applying a
different rule would upset settled expectations.149
This does not mean that all arbitrators follow the rule or that
the rule is predictable in its application.150 To the contrary, the
143. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
144. Once again, I assume for now that system users do not share a rule preference; if that
assumption is relaxed, arbitrators are constrained in obvious and potent ways. See supra text
accompanying note 135.
145. For an example, see City of Marshall v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
984, 988 (1991) (Allen, Arb.).
146. See, e.g., In re Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t Tex. Air Nat’l Guard, 115 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249,
250-51 (2000) (Moore, Arb.) (“Since 1944, there has been the widely accepted general rule of
‘work now, grieve later’ recognized in labor relations.”).
147. Id. at 252.
148. Cf. Alexander, supra note 141, at 5-8 (describing these rationales supporting the
natural model of precedent); Schauer, supra note 141, at 595-97 (describing the virtues of
precedential constraint).
149. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132, 158 (Dec. 13) (separate
opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen) (suggesting that even prior incorrect awards should be
followed unless the costs of the incorrect rule “decisively outweigh the injustice created by
disturbing settled expectations”).
150. For a description of varying approaches when the employee is disciplined for refusing
to work overtime, see In re Keystone Steel & Wire, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 423, 427 (1990)
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arbitrator’s decision may be influenced by a number of considerations, including the arbitrator’s own preference as to the correct
rule. Nevertheless, the desire to afford equal treatment and to honor
settled expectations will likely influence the decision, perhaps
significantly so.151 After all, even if system users have divergent
preferences as to substantive rules, they may all value equality of
treatment and adjudicatory consistency, both as worthwhile normative goals and because these attributes enable planning and
private dispute resolution.152 The point is simple: even without a
doctrine of stare decisis, the mere existence of a relevant past award
might provide an independent reason to reach a similar result
now.153
From the foregoing discussion, we can see why an arbitration
system that features reasoned, accessible awards might intrinsically
generate precedent. In such a system, past awards offer parties and
their lawyers a language in which to frame their arguments. Past
awards may provoke deliberation and debate among arbitrators.
And past awards invite arguments couched in normative terms—
like the need to ensure equality of treatment—that enjoy widespread support among system users notwithstanding their divergent
preferences on matters of substance.
B. Filling Gaps in, or Displacing, State-Supplied Law
As the foregoing Section has explained, a system of arbitral
precedent may require the use of reasoned, accessible awards. I
have also attempted to flesh out the arbitration literature’s
(Goldstein, Arb.).
151. Cf. Alexander, supra note 141, at 8-9 (noting that these equality and reliance values
might influence the decision maker’s assessment of the morally correct result).
152. One early survey, for example, found that 73 percent of management representatives
and 78 percent of union representatives would assign at least “some weight” to prior
arbitration awards interpreting different CBAs. Seven percent of management respondents
and 19 percent of union respondents indicated that arbitrators should assign “decisive
weight.” Warren & Bernstein, supra note 65, at 216; see also Seitz, supra note 110, at 59
(“[S]tability and uniformity in interpretation ... is a desideratum.”).
153. Put differently, arbitrators may come to believe that while “[i]t may be debatable
whether arbitrators have a legal obligation to follow precedents—probably not—but it seems
well settled that they have a moral obligation to follow precedents so as to foster a normative
environment that is predictable.” Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 374.
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(implicit) argument that arbitral precedent will always arise in such
cases. On reflection, however, this claim is somewhat dubious. As
this Section explains, a robust body of arbitral precedent is likely to
arise only when it serves some function beneficial to the parties who
use and pay for the system. Parties who do not derive such benefits
will be less willing to make the investments—such as paying
lawyers to research and build arguments around past awards and
paying arbitrators to consider these authorities—necessary to create
a truly robust system of precedent.
The following discussion explores two possible functions that
arbitral precedent may serve. First, precedent may fill gaps in the
law governing the parties’ dispute. Because most disputes will be
governed by state-supplied law, this gap-filling function will be most
relevant when that law is “thin.” Second, parties who wish to avoid
state-supplied law may grant arbitrators the power to develop an
alternative set of legal rules. For these parties, one benefit of
arbitration is that it provides an institutional context in which such
rules may evolve.
1. Arbitral Precedent as Gap-Filler
Many, and perhaps most, arbitrated disputes are governed by
state-supplied law—that is, the law supplied by public actors like
courts and legislatures.154 If there is a “thick” body of such law, the
dispute can be resolved by looking to sources external to the system
of arbitration: statutes, administrative regulations, judicial opinions, etc. In such cases, there will be little need to consider prior
awards.155 When there is only a thin body of state-supplied law,
however, arbitral precedent may serve an important gap-filling

154. See, e.g., Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 536-44 (presenting evidence suggesting
that international commercial arbitrations typically are governed by national law); Rau, supra
note 126, at 88 (noting that parties will often want their “conduct judged by external legal
standards”).
155. See Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1987) (noting that, even if arbitrators were not obliged to apply
antitrust law, they would likely do so rather than incur the cost of “developing an alternative
set of principles and acceptable modes of reasoning”).
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function. In effect, arbitral precedent may supply default rules when
the state has failed to do so.156
Parties might find such gap-filling valuable in a variety of
contexts. For example, parties to underspecified, long-term contracts
may rely on arbitrators to supply open terms or otherwise to guide
their ongoing relationship.157 Thus, employers and unions rely on
labor arbitrators to clarify the meaning of CBA terms,158 a practice
that relieves the parties of the need to address every possible
contingency in the CBA itself.159 Likewise, firms that implement
large numbers of transactions through standardized contracts may
value consistent interpretation of contract language.160 When there
are no judicial opinions interpreting the relevant contract, arbitrators may look to past awards to fill the void. Conversely, in disputes
that turn on unique facts or rarely invoked contract provisions,
there will be less need for a system of precedent.161
The foregoing discussion sheds further light on the apparently
greater reliance on arbitral precedent by ICSID and labor arbitrators relative to arbitrators in international commercial disputes.
ICSID jurisdiction is often based on a general consent to arbitration
in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the host state and
the investor’s home state. Because state action rarely impacts “one

156. At least in theory, arbitrators cannot create mandatory rules. The arbitrator’s
authority is limited by the parties’ contract, and the parties can always specify a different law
or contract out of arbitration altogether. It is at least possible, however, that the decisions
reached by arbitrators might inform a court’s view of what mandatory law should be. In some
cases, moreover, the cost of contracting around arbitral precedent might be high enough to
leave a party “stuck” with precedent it would prefer to avoid. This concern may explain the
reluctance of some ICSID users to create an appellate mechanism for investment disputes.
See infra note 222.
157. Rau, supra note 33, at 536 (noting arbitration’s gap-filling function when parties are
in a continuing relationship).
158. See Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
920 (1979).
159. Cf. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 856-57 (2006) (noting that more cost-effective enforcement mechanisms
reduce the need for up-front investments in contract specificity). Relatedly, arbitrators might
be superior to courts at detecting substandard performance. See Steven Shavell, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-6 (1995).
160. See Rau, supra note 33, at 536.
161. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 375-76 (suggesting this as an explanation for
lower award citation rates in international commercial arbitration).
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foreign investor in isolation,”162 a large number of similarly situated
investors may assert claims under the treaty.163 In such cases, both
states and investors may value consistent interpretation of the BIT.
Moreover, thousands of investment treaties have been concluded
worldwide.164 To the extent treaty provisions are standardized
within or across states, system users may value consistent interpretation.165
Similar benefits may accrue from labor arbitration precedent.
Labor disputes involve repeat players with ongoing relationships
governed by contracts that apply broadly within particular workplaces and that may be standardized across them. Moreover,
because courts typically do not hear disputes arising under these
contracts, labor arbitrators are the only adjudicators able to ensure
consistent interpretation of these terms. By contrast, it is possible
that commercial contracts are less standardized and that disputes
arising out of these contracts will more often turn on unique facts
or contract language.166 Additionally, despite intense and long162. MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 42 (2008).
163. See id. at 91-96.
164. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 26 (indicating that during and after the 1990s,
“roughly 2,000 bilateral investment treaties were concluded of about 2,400 now signed”).
165. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & InterAguas Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction ¶¶ 50-51 (May 16, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (scroll down to number
14; then follow “Decision on Jurisdiction” hyperlink) (noting the “growing jurisprudence of
arbitral decisions interpreting treaty provisions” and citing past awards supporting the
tribunal’s interpretation); Pierre Duprey, Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents?, in INT’L
ARB. INST., TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? 276-77 (Emmanuel
Gaillard ed., 2005) (noting similarity across treaties and the resulting concern with uniform
interpretation); Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations Initiated
Under Investment Treaties, 16 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 20, 21 (2001) (noting similarity
in substantive BIT provisions). I do not mean to suggest that BIT terms are virtually
identical; there may be important differences. See, e.g., DIMSEY, supra note 162, at 14 (noting
that “[t]here are no ‘typical features’ of BITs” and that controversy revolves around the
precedential value of awards interpreting similar BITs); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Towards a
Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain, in ARBITRATING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 61 (Norbert Horn & Steton Kröll eds., 2004) (noting that BIT
provisions are not uniform but address similar issues). The point is only that BITs sometimes
adopt terms that are similar or identical to those appearing in other BITs, and that states and
investors may value uniform interpretation of those terms. See Duprey, supra, at 277.
166. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 375-76.
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standing interest in lex mercatoria,167 the evidence suggests that
most international commercial disputes are governed by national
law,168 which in many cases may be “sufficiently developed to be
predictable.”169 If that is so, parties to commercial disputes may
have less need of arbitral precedent, except perhaps to address
procedural questions specific to arbitration.170 The existing research,
although limited, is consistent with this prediction: arbitrators in
international commercial disputes appear to cite past awards only
rarely, and primarily on questions of procedure and jurisdiction.171
In addition to filling gaps in state-supplied law, arbitral precedent may supply answers to questions that arise only in arbitration.
Thus, we might expect arbitrators to consult past awards on
questions of arbitration procedure, for courts rarely will have
occasion to address such questions.172 Indeed, even with respect to
questions of substantive law, arbitration may become so widely used
in some contexts that courts have few opportunities to address novel
but recurring issues. To take an example from somewhat further
afield, the AAA promulgates rules governing arbitrations conducted
as class actions.173 These disputes may be arbitrated only if the
parties’ contract permits class arbitration.174 As it turns out, most
of the relevant contracts say nothing whatsoever about class
arbitration; they simply incorporate AAA rules that permit the
procedure. Yet some of these contracts also include explicit terms
167. See generally KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF LEX MERCATORIA
(1999); LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev. ed. 1998).
168. See Drahozal, supra note 49, at 536-44 (finding little empirical support for the claim
that parties to international commercial arbitrations contract out of national law).
169. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 375.
170. See id. at 375-76; see also infra text accompanying note 172. The fact that most
international commercial contracts contain choice-of-law clauses selecting national law is
further evidence that national law is sufficiently well developed to lend certainty to
international transactions. See Drahozal, supra note 34, at 533-34.
171. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 362.
172. See Strong, supra note 120 (manuscript at 12-13) (noting that courts do not often
address questions of procedure or conflict of interest that may arise in international
commercial arbitration).
173. The AAA class action docket is available online at Searchable Class Arbitration
Docket, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
174. This consent to class arbitration may be implicit, although the Supreme Court is
currently considering whether parties who have not explicitly consented to the procedure may
be required to participate in class arbitration. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009).
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that seem to conflict with the AAA rules, such as terms requiring
the arbitration to be conducted in private.175 When such a conflict
exists, should the contract be interpreted to permit class arbitration?
This is a straightforward question of contract interpretation, but
it will rarely be answered by a court. Unless the parties agree
otherwise, “the question—whether the agreement forbids class arbitration—is for the arbitrator to decide.”176 Because few courts will
address this precise question,177 and because the question recurs
with some frequency, we might expect arbitrators to treat prior
awards as precedent. And indeed, that appears to be the practice in
these arbitrations.178

175. See, e.g., Dub Herring Ford v. Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., AAA Case No. 11 181
01119 06, Clause Construction Award at 15-17 (Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.
adr.org/si.asp?id=4542. For AAA rules, compare SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATION R. 9(a) (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936, with
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 23 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n
2009), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R23.
176. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003). This is a default rule;
the contract may provide otherwise. Bazzle is also a plurality opinion, although Justice
Stevens, in his concurring opinion, appears to agree with the plurality’s allocation of decisionmaking authority. See id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
177. A party who objects to the arbitrator’s ruling on this question may ask a court to
vacate the award. But because judicial review of arbitral awards is limited, especially on
questions of contract interpretation, courts are unlikely to review the merits of the arbitrator’s
decision, see Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009), or so one would have thought before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Stolt-Nielson, a case in which the arbitration tribunal ruled that a class
arbitration could proceed in the face of contractual silence on the question.
178. See, e.g., Fox Valley Ford v. Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., AAA Case No. 11 117 01929
06, Clause Construction Award and Order on Motion to Stay on Grounds of Dominant
Jurisdiction at 8-9 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5134; Hausner
v. United Healthcare, AAA Case No. 11 193 Y 00447 07, Partial Final Clause Construction
Award at 11-12 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5058; Dub Herring
Ford, AAA Case No. 11 181 01119 06, Clause Construction Award at 17; Terrapin Express,
Inc. v. Airborne Express, Inc., AAA Case No. 11 199 01536 05, Clause Construction Award at
4-8 (May 9, 2006), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29386 (follow “clause construction award” hyperlink).
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2. Arbitral Precedent as a Tool for Displacing State-Supplied
Law
The foregoing examples have assumed that the parties are
content to have state-supplied law govern their disputes, at least on
questions of substance. In some cases, of course, parties may wish
to have their conduct governed by a different set of legal rules.179
One benefit of arbitration is that it provides an institutional context
in which such rules can evolve.180
As noted previously, for example, members of a trade association
might empower arbitrators to create binding legal rules by adopting
contract terms requiring arbitrators to follow past awards.181 More
commonly, industry members might specify the applicable rules in
advance, leaving arbitrators to apply these rules and, once again, to
fill any gaps left by the parties.182 In such a system, it is plausible
to assume that arbitrators will assign precedential value to past
awards. In this way, as Professor Steven Ware has noted, arbitration may produce “privatized law in the fullest sense.”183
When the relevant state-supplied law consists of default rules,
using arbitration for this purpose may be relatively unprob179. On the benefits of such rules, see Ware, supra note 16, at 744-47.
180. See id. at 744-47; Weidemaier, supra note 28, at 661.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74. I suspect that few arbitration systems
operate in this fashion, in part because many parties will be reluctant to confer such power
on arbitrators. To be sure, the parties may ultimately control the content, and indeed the
existence, of precedent by specifying the applicable rules in their contracts, refusing to employ
arbitrators who do not follow the preferred rules, or explicitly limiting the precedential value
of past awards. But these forms of control are costly to exercise, and at times might be high
enough to leave a party “stuck” with precedent it would prefer to avoid. For example, in the
ICSID context, a state party to bilateral investment treaties that contain its general consent
to arbitration might have to renegotiate these treaties to opt out of the existing system of
ICSID precedent. (Some states might also attempt to “withdraw” from ICSID despite giving
prior consent to arbitration, see infra note 251, although this strategy may entail significant
reputational cost.) Indeed, concern over the “stickiness” of arbitral precedent may explain
opposition to proposals for an ICSID appellate review mechanism. See infra note 222.
182. In most examples of trade industry association, the governing rules are specified by
industry members, for example in written bylaws. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 8, at 126
(noting that New York Diamond Dealers Club arbitrators resolve disputes based on trade
customs and usages set forth in the DDC bylaws); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1765, 1805 n.134 (1996) (listing examples of associations with written trade rules).
183. Ware, supra note 16, at 747.
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lematic.184 But it may also be cause for concern, as when parties
seek to use arbitration to circumvent supposedly mandatory law,185
possibly replacing this law with rules that offer greater private
benefits.186 Again, however, my concern in this Article is not with
the content of arbitral law. Rather, the point is that arbitration
cannot confer these benefits if arbitrators feel at liberty to disregard
past awards.
C. Attitudes Concerning Arbitrators’ Legitimacy as Producers of
Law
Thus far, we have seen that arbitral precedent is more likely to
arise when the relevant system of arbitration is structurally
conducive to precedent creation and when arbitral precedent fills
gaps in state-supplied law or assists the parties in creating alternative legal rules. But even in arbitration systems that meet this
description, arbitrators may not immediately enjoy unquestioned
legitimacy as producers of law. The following discussion explores the
process by which arbitrators might gain such legitimacy and
suggests that this process may be important to the development of
precedent.
1. Precedent’s Uncertain Place in a System of Arbitration
Consider the position of an arbitrator faced with an argument
from precedent in a system in which there are no clear norms
governing the use of past awards. In our previous example, one
184. See id. at 744-47.
185. This concern underlies arguments that arbitration effectively allows parties to
contract out of mandatory rules. E.g., id. at 710-12; see also Paul D. Carrington,
Unconscionable Lawyers, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 267 (2002) (referring to predispute arbitration
clauses in consumer and employment relationships as “self-deregulation,” though
emphasizing the supposed unfairness of arbitration rather than its potential to replace public
with private legal rules).
186. Cf. Cooter, supra note 97, at 107-08 (noting similarities between income-maximizing
private judges and prestige-maximizing public judges, but also that desire for prestige with
nonlitigants may lead public judges to “give weight to third parties” in situations where a
private judge would not); Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 239 (noting that, whatever the
socially optimal rule, private judges must apply rules that offer private benefits to system
users).
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party to an investment arbitration urged the tribunal to adopt a
prior award’s definition of the host state’s obligation to provide “fair
and equitable” treatment.187 This form of argument—in which a past
decision is proffered as an independent reason for reaching a desired
result—is surely commonplace in any system in which litigants are
aware of past decisions. One possible judicial analog involves a
litigant citing one federal district judge’s opinion to another district
judge. To be sure, the prior decision does not bind the present
judge.188 Yet it would not be surprising if the judge acknowledged
the decision’s relevance and engaged in detail with its reasoning.189
Perhaps more tellingly, the judge might safely—that is, without
serious reputational or other cost—label the decision “persuasive”
and adopt its result without additional explanation.190
For arbitrators, however, appearing to rely heavily on past
awards might sometimes entail risk.191 U.S. law, for example, conceives of the arbitrator as the parties’ agent, charged with resolving
disputes in accordance with their agreement.192 Arbitrators who do
not discharge this obligation to the parties’ satisfaction risk losing
future business. Given that constraint, the award serves an impor187. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
188. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2009).
189. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2001); Mich. Elec.
Employees Pension Fund v. Encompass Elec. & Data, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 746, 761-62 (W.D.
Mich. 2008).
190. E.g., Johnson v. Hill, 619 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Gilyard v. Northlake
Foods, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (E.D. Va. 2005).
191. In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, ICSID arguably forbids a tribunal to
resolve an issue merely by citing to a prior tribunal’s resolution. Article 52(1)(e) permits
annulment if “the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.” ICSID
Convention, supra note 40, 17 U.S.T. at 1290, 575 U.N.T.S. at 192. Under this provision, “an
application for annulment that alleges an excess of powers or a failure to state reasons
because the tribunal simply relied on earlier decisions without making an independent
decision or developing its own reasons is entirely possible.” Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note
45, at 8.
192. EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2001); Kirgis, supra note
103, at 6-7, 32-33. To a degree, this principal-agent model breaks down in the context of
international arbitration, perhaps especially investment arbitration. See Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Judging Judges: From ‘Principal-Agent Theory’ to ‘Constitutional Justice’ in
Multilevel ‘Judicial Governance’ of Economic Cooperation Among Citizens, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON.
L. 827, 880-81 (2008) (arguing that international judges and arbitrators must depart from this
principal-agent model to take third party interests into account). As ICSID demonstrates,
however, arbitrators may still be uncertain, at least initially, about the precedential value of
past awards. See infra text accompanying notes 205-07.
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tant communicative function: signaling competence, judgment, and
impartiality.193 In some cases, citations to past awards may serve a
similar function by suggesting that “prestigious authority exists to
support the decision made.”194 Put somewhat differently, citations
can provide cover by communicating that the arbitrator is within
the mainstream and therefore should be viewed by future disputants as an acceptable choice.195
Yet awards may also communicate negative information. Most
relevant here, arbitrators may wish to avoid the appearance of
giving excessive weight to other arbitrators’ decisions. Most will
quite correctly “perceive that they have been chosen to serve
because of their judgment”196—chosen, that is, to render a decision
that is sensitive to the particularities of the parties’ relationship.197
Heavy reliance on past awards, no matter how “persuasive,”
potentially smacks of abdication of this duty.198 Moreover, without
any clear norms governing their use, reliance on past awards raises
193. See supra note 108.
194. Seitz, supra note 110, at 59. One function of a reasoned award is to confer legitimacy
on the arbitrator’s decision, especially in the eyes of the losing party. See Richard Mittenthal
& Howard S. Block, The Ever-Present Role of Arbitral Discretion, in LABOR ARBITRATION
UNDER FIRE 251-52 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997); Rau, supra note 33, at 531.
Though presumably parties are more attentive to reasons than to citations, see Mittenthal &
Block, supra, at 251, citations may serve some legitimizing function as well.
195. Given complete information, and assuming litigants are concerned primarily with the
distributional consequences of their choice of arbitrator, “[a]rbitrators who have taken
extreme positions relative to their colleagues” are likely to be eliminated from consideration
in future disputes. Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitrator Behavior, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 342, 343 (1987).
Because litigants are not likely to have complete information about potential arbitrators, they
are likely to base their selection decisions on proxies. I do not suggest that litigants choose
an arbitrator based on the number of citations in the arbitrator’s past awards. Surely they do
not. But litigants are likely to read past awards issued by arbitrators who are under serious
consideration. Roger I. Abrams et al., Arbitral Therapy, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1751, 1766
(1994); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,
477 (1996). And they may be more willing to overlook an apparently unfavorable award that
manages to convey—perhaps by citing similar awards—that other arbitrators would have
produced the same outcome.
196. Seitz, supra note 110, at 60 (noting dangers of relying on past awards, especially those
issued by “unproven” arbitrators).
197. See Kirgis, supra note 103, at 29-34.
198. Cf. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES § 2(G) (Nat’l Acad. of Arbitrators, as amended Sept. 2007) (recognizing that
arbitrators may assign weight to past awards but emphasizing that arbitrators bear “full
personal responsibility” for their decisions).
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a number of fundamental questions: Without a doctrine of stare
decisis, why is the award entitled to any weight at all in the
arbitrator’s decision? How much weight should it receive? What
considerations are even relevant to this question of weight? How
will system users perceive extensive engagement with past
awards—as evidence of diligence and expertise, or as evidence that
the arbitrator has merely “augment[ed] the cost” of arbitration by
play-acting like a judge?199
Arbitrators rightly may suspect that system users have diverse
preferences on these matters. Recall that few arbitration systems
are intentionally designed to create precedent. Thus, system users
are not likely to have given much thought to the status of past
awards and, once the question becomes salient, there is no guarantee they will agree on the answer. When system users have
divergent preferences, it will sometimes be easy for each user to
implement its own preferred regime. For example, a business that
employs a standard arbitration clause in form contracts might
revise the clause to prevent the use of past awards as authority.200
But in an arbitration system like ICSID, in which arbitration
clauses most frequently appear in bilateral treaties, and where
neither the multilateral ICSID treaty nor the default set of institutional arbitration rules clearly address the subject of arbitral
precedent,201 the costs involved in reaching and implementing an
agreement as to the precedential value of past awards may be
prohibitive.202
The upshot of all this is that questions concerning the value of
past awards often will have to be resolved in contested normative
space. Yet they must be resolved if a truly robust system of precedent is to arise—if, that is, arbitrators are to feel an “obligation to
strive for consistency and predictability”203 and to engage in “an
199. Seitz, supra note 110, at 60.
200. See, e.g., Verizon Agreement, supra note 21 (“An arbitration award and any judgment
confirming it only applies to the arbitration in which it was awarded and can’t be used in any
other case except to enforce the award itself.”).
201. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
202. See Wälde, supra note 140, at 46 (“Once set into motion, judicial law-making is not
easy to stop or interrupt as the political capital investment necessary for legislation by treaty,
in particular multilateral treaties, is hard to mobilize.”).
203. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 374.
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overt and system-wide discussion of applicable decisional predicates.”204 Once again, ICSID and labor arbitration illustrate how
this process may (or may not) unfold.
2. Evolving Attitudes in ICSID and Labor Arbitration
Participants in ICSID and labor arbitrations did not always view
awards as legitimate sources of authority and arbitrators as
legitimate producers of law. As noted previously, ICSID was not
intentionally designed to generate precedent.205 Perhaps for this
reason, system participants did not immediately recognize past
awards as entitled to any weight at all.206 As Jeffery Commission
has recounted, early ICSID tribunals rarely discussed the value of
past awards.207 No doubt this pattern derived, in part, from the fact
that relatively few potentially precedential awards had been issued.
Yet early tribunals did have opportunities to address prior awards
and equivocated about their relevance.208
This early equivocation is unsurprising; there has long been
debate over the precedential value of awards issued by international
tribunals.209 The debate spans a range of topics, from disputes over
204. Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1205.
205. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. The negotiations that preceded the
Convention included discussion of the proper default rule concerning award publication. See
2 Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Documents Concerning the Origin and
Formulation of the Convention, Part 2, at 817, SID/LC/SR/16 (Dec. 30, 1964). Delegates
rejected a proposal to require publication unless the parties objected in favor of a rule
requiring consent to publish. Id. In fact, during the relevant discussions in December 1964,
one of the delegates explicitly asked whether “the decisions of the arbitral tribunals would
become precedents in other cases, even if they were not published.” Id. The response, credited
to Aron Broches, was noncommittal at best: that many awards were likely to become public,
for example during court proceedings when the award “would become a matter of public
knowledge as part of the documents of that case.” Id. at 818. The specific question concerning
the precedential value of past awards does not appear to have been addressed.
206. See Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 I.L.M. 351, 371 (ICSID Arb. Trib.
1984) (discussing parties’ citation to prior award and distinguishing the award “to the extent
to which it is a precedent”).
207. See Commission, supra note 34, at 144-45.
208. See Amco, 23 I.L.M. at 371 (responding to both parties’ citations to a prior award by
noting that the tribunal’s result was not “contrary to that precedent (to the extent to which
it is a precedent)”).
209. CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 651-55
(1998) (summarizing and evaluating criticisms of Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal precedent). For
a discussion of the views expressed by ICSID tribunals about the precedential value of prior
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whether awards merit any precedential weight,210 to efforts to
articulate factors that might assist arbitrators in assigning
precedential weight to past awards.211 Increasingly, however, these
debates take for granted the existence and legitimacy of arbitral
precedent. For example, one such debate—implicating the familiar
tradeoff between finality and consistency212—concerns the need for
a mechanism to ensure consistency in the awards rendered by
different tribunals.213 Importantly, arbitrators have actively participated in these debates and used awards as vehicles for expressing
their views. It is not uncommon for awards to analyze the relevance
of arbitral precedent214 or to offer extended discussion of the
conditions under which arbitrators should follow or reject this
precedent.215 In these discussions, arbitrators often envision

awards, see Commission, supra note 34, at 144-48.
210. E.g., BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 209, at 651-55 (discussing Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal).
211. See, e.g., Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 525-37; Matti Pellonpää, Remarks at
the Second Joint Conference (July 22, 1993), in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT A TIME OF MOMENTOUS CHANGE (1994).
212. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
110-12 (1991); Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does Investor-State
Arbitration Need an Appellate System?, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (2005).
213. See, e.g., DIMSEY, supra note 162, at 40-43 (critiquing lack of consistency in investment
arbitration awards); Bjorklund, supra note 48, at 270-80 (discussing ways to maximize
predictability and legitimacy of arbitral awards); Cheng, supra note 34, at 1044-46 (arguing
that strong internal controls may compensate for the lack of an appellate mechanism in
investment arbitration, though noting pressure caused by increasing diversity among
arbitrators); Franck, supra note 33, at 1606-10 (proposing the establishment of an appellate
body to review investment arbitration awards); Laird & Askew, supra note 212, at 299
(evaluating the need for an appellate mechanism in investor-state arbitration).
214. See Commission, supra note 34, at 144-48 (tracking evolution in the views concerning
arbitral precedent expressed in ICSID awards).
215. See, e.g., Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Rep. of Iran v. United States), 1989
I.C.J. 132, 158 (Dec. 13) (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); Saipem v. Bangladesh,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional
Measures ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (search
“Saipem”; then follow “ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7” hyperlink; then follow “Decisions &
Awards” tab; then follow “Decision on Jurisdiction” hyperlink); AES Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 17-33 (April 26, 2005),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AES-Argentina-Jurisdiction_000.pdf; see also
Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 6 ASPER REV. OF INT’L BUS. &
TRADE LAW 419, 572 (Jan. 26, 2006) (opinion of Professor Thomas Wälde in NAFTA
arbitration).
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themselves as engaged in developing a consistent body of investment law.216
Through this discussion and debate, participants and observers
have actively shaped system norms that treat arbitrators as
legitimate producers of law. To the extent there were initial doubts
about the precedential value of past awards, these have been
largely, though perhaps not completely, resolved.217 Lawyers
commonly cite awards in support of their clients’ positions.218
Arbitrators routinely explain their decisions by reference to past
awards219 and promote consistency as an important system value.220
This does not mean that investment tribunals always issue

216. As one ICSID tribunal stated:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same
time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions
of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent
cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the
circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the
harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate
expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the
rule of law.
Saipem, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, ¶ 67; see also City Oriente Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, Decision on Provisional Measures, 2007 WL 5366469, ¶ 87 (Nov.
19, 2007); Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 376-78.
217. Compare Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 I.L.M. 351, 371 (ICSID Arb.
Trib. 1984) (discussing parties’ citation to prior award and distinguishing the award “to the
extent to which it is a precedent”), with El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 39 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending
(scroll down to number 13; then follow “Decisions on Jurisdiction” hyperlink) (noting that it
is “a reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, notably those established
within the ICSID system, will generally take account of the precedents established by ... other
international tribunals”).
218. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 708 (2004) (discussing
party submissions in NAFTA arbitrations); Gibson & Drahozal, supra note 34, at 541-44
(same).
219. See Commission, supra note 34, at 129-32; Drahozal, supra note 34, at 1, 8; Gibson &
Drahozal, supra note 34, at 522-24.
220. Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Recommendation on Provisional Measures ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (then search “Saipem”; then follow “ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7” hyperlink; then follow “Decisions & Awards” tab; then follow “Decision on
Jurisdiction” hyperlink).
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consistent awards.221 It does, however, demonstrate the existence
of strong, initially contested norms that legitimize reliance on
arbitral precedent and emphasize the virtues of consistent decision
making.222
Labor arbitration followed a similar pattern. The initial decision
to publicize labor awards provoked controversy.223 Over time,
however, that controversy has abated, and there is widespread
acceptance of the fact that, although arbitrators bear “full personal
responsibility” for their decisions,224 they may legitimately assign
precedential weight to past awards.225 Interest among arbitrators,
lawyers, and management and union representatives is such that
The Common Law of the Workplace, a standard reference in labor
arbitration, attempts to distill the decisions of labor arbitrators into
a coherent set of principles to guide future disputes.226 This effort
has, in turn, sparked scholarly interest into whether these distilla-

221. See DIMSEY, supra note 162, at 40-43 (criticizing inconsistency in investment treaty
arbitration awards and offering solutions); Franck, supra note 33, at 1606-10 (same). For a
somewhat more skeptical view, see Laird & Askew, supra note 212, at 299.
222. This does not mean that arbitral precedent is viewed as an unqualified good in
investment arbitration. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State
Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1610 (2009) [hereinafter Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda] (objecting
to investment arbitration’s “universalistic claims and pretensions”). Indeed, reluctance to
empower arbitrators to create truly “sticky” rules of international investment law—rules that
can be changed only by amending BITs or withdrawing from the ICSID Convention—may
explain the reluctance of some states to create an ICSID appellate mechanism. See José E.
Alvarez, Book Review, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 909, 915 (2008); see also Jason Webb Yackee,
Toward a Minimalist System of International Investment Law?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 303, 317-19 (2009) [hereinafter Yackee, Minimalist System] (“[T]here is an obvious
danger that establishing an appellate mechanism would ... mak[e] it more likely that
politically incorrect interpretations or applications would become reified as ‘the law’ with even
fewer opportunities for political correction than currently exist.”).
223. See, e.g., Leo Cherne, Should Arbitration Awards Be Published?, 1 ARB. J. (n.s.) 75,
75-76 (1946); Jennings & Martin, supra note 67, at 96-98 (summarizing conflicting views as
to the value of prior awards as precedent); Aaron Levenstein, Some Obstacles to Reporting
Labor Arbitration, 1 ARB. J. (n.s.) 425, 425-28 (1946); William H. McPherson, Should Labor
Arbitrators Play Follow-the-Leader?, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 163, 164-68 (1949).
224. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES § 2(G) (Nat’l Acad. of Arbitrators, as amended Sept. 2007).
225. For example, in one early survey, a large majority of responding arbitrators,
management representatives, and union representatives indicated that prior awards should
receive at least “some weight” even when they involve different CBAs. See supra note 152.
226. COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE, supra note 64.
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tions accurately capture the content of labor arbitrators’ discipline
and discharge decisions.227
3. Shaping Conceptions of the Arbitrator’s Role
Both ICSID and labor arbitration, then, suggest that in truly
robust systems of arbitral precedent, participants come to view
arbitrators as legitimate producers of law. What determines
whether this will happen? The answer begins, of course, with the
parties and their lawyers. In each system, party submissions to the
arbitrators commonly include citations to past awards.228 If widely
followed, this practice communicates that past awards merit
weight as precedent and that system users value adjudicatory
consistency.229 But the experience in each system—and especially in
ICSID—also suggests a more complicated story, one in which
arbitrators meaningfully shape system participants’ attitudes about
arbitral precedent.
One way they may do this is by citing to past awards, implicitly
signaling that these have value as precedent. But arbitrators’ efforts
may be much more explicit. In ICSID, those efforts have involved
making two intellectual moves. First, both in their awards and in
their scholarly writings, arbitrators have promoted consistency and
predictability as important values in investment transactions.230
227. E.g., Laura J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and Why Labor
Arbitrators Decide Discipline and Discharge Cases: An Empirical Examination, in NAT’L ACAD.
OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION 2007: WORKPLACE JUSTICE FOR A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 42
(Stephen F. Befert & Patrick Halter eds., 2008).
228. See, e.g., In re Atl. Auto. Components, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 630, 636-37 & nn.1821 (2006) (Brodsky, Arb.) (labor arbitration award discussing authorities cited by parties);
Gantz, supra note 218, at 708 (presenting evidence from NAFTA arbitrations); Gibson &
Drahozal, supra note 34, at 541-44 (same).
229. See, e.g., El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 39 (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://icsid.wroldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending (scroll down to
number 13; then follow “Decision in Jurisdiction” hyperlink) (stating that the tribunal would
take account of prior awards “especially since both parties, in their written pleadings and oral
arguments, have heavily relied on precedent”).
230. See, e.g., City Oriente Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21,
Decision on Provisional Measures, 2007 WL 5366469, ¶ 87 (Nov. 19, 2007); Saipem v.
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on
Provisional Measures ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
Index.jsp (search “Saipem”; then follow “ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7” hyperlink; then follow
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Second, arbitrators have argued that they bear primary responsibility for promoting these values. Thus, after repeating the usual
platitudes about the formally nonbinding nature of past awards, one
ICSID tribunal noted:
At the same time, [the tribunal] is of the opinion that it must
pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international
tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary
grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series
of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics
of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it
has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development
of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty
of the rule of law.231

These calls for consistency, however, do not meaningfully distinguish international investment from other arbitrators. Indeed,
arbitrators not infrequently issue calls for “consistency,” or urge the
benefits of a system of arbitral precedent, without any apparent
impact on system participants’ behavior.232 That arbitrators would
issue such calls is hardly surprising. In an arbitration system
“Decisions & Awards” tab; then follow “Decision on Jurisdiction” hyperlink); KaufmannKohler, supra note 48, at 376-78.
231. Saipem, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, ¶ 67 (citations omitted); see also City Oriente
Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21, 2007 WL 5366469, ¶ 87; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48,
at 376-78.
232. For example, one securities arbitration panel, after noting that each side had cited
unreasoned awards in support of its case, complained of the widespread use of unreasoned
awards in securities arbitration and explained its own decision to issue a reasoned award:
We hope our willingness to take on this task will encourage future NASD panels
to be more forthcoming, so that a body of meaningful precedents, interpreting
the securities laws of the various states, may become available, absent the
ability of the various state courts to develop their respective state laws. After all,
NASD panels are charged not only with making findings of fact, but also to
interpret laws and apply them to those facts, even though they are not required
to articulate their reasoning.... [W]e hope more panels will explain their
decisions, including the legal bases therefore. Only in this manner, will NASD
decisions themselves become meaningful precedent.
Koruga v. Ming Wang, NASD Case No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *11-12 (Oct. 5, 2001).
Yet unreasoned awards remain the norm in securities arbitration. See Jennifer J. Johnson,
Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 123, 144-45 (2005).
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featuring a specialized body of precedent, parties and their lawyers
will expect arbitrators to be familiar with past awards233 and will
treat familiarity with precedent as one “measure [of] an arbitrator’s
professional sophistication and competence.”234 For that reason,
arbitrators can capture status and prestige by demonstrating
familiarity with, or making substantial contributions to, a specialized body of arbitral precedent.235
If this is true across a variety of arbitration contexts, what makes
investment arbitration so unique? The following discussion suggests
two answers to that question. First, the system of ICSID precedent
can be understood as a response by arbitrators to external critics
whose objections threatened ICSID’s viability as a forum for resolving investment disputes. Thus, much as reasoned awards can confer
legitimacy on the process of arbitration,236 ICSID demonstrates that
arbitral precedent sometimes may serve a similar function. Second,
ICSID arbitrators are remarkably well positioned to foster norms
concerning their role as producers of law. Although these two factors
render ICSID somewhat unique, they yield broader insights—
explored in Part III—into the development of precedent in other
systems of arbitration.
a. Arbitral Precedent as Legitimacy-Seeking Strategy
As I have noted, one function of a reasoned award is to confer
legitimacy on the arbitration with disputants, external actors, or
both.237 ICSID suggests that arbitral precedent sometimes may serve
a similar function. To understand why, recall that, at an absolute
minimum, a system of arbitration must produce an award that the
losing party will comply with voluntarily or that can be enforced in
233. See Bjorklund, supra note 48, at 277 (noting that clients might expect arbitrators to
be familiar with past awards).
234. Rogers, supra note 34, at 1000-01 (referring to international commercial arbitration).
235. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 126, at 89; Filip De Ly, Lex Mercatoria (New Law
Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-Regulation, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE
LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 159, 180 (Richard P. Appelbaum,
William L.F. Felstiner & Volkmar Gessner eds., 2001); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex
Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448 (2007). For a
general discussion of arbitrators’ tendency to engage in reputation-enhancing activities, see
Rutledge, supra note 19, at 164-65.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
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the absence of voluntary compliance.238 Recall, too, that formal legal
enforcement tools are of limited use in investment disputes.239
Instead, states comply with investment arbitration awards primarily because the reputational costs of noncompliance exceed the
benefits of disregarding the award. For this reason, ICSID tribunals
must be sensitive to how their awards will be perceived not only by
the disputants themselves, but also by the wide variety of external
actors positioned to impose reputational sanctions.240
Yet ICSID faces serious challenges to its legitimacy, some of
which fundamentally threaten its very existence as a tool for
resolving investment disputes. For example, some critics object that
a system modeled on private commercial arbitration cannot
legitimately resolve “regulatory disputes between investors and the
state.”241 ICSID arbitrators, critics argue, operate “in a one-sided
system of state liability, in which only investors bring the claims
and only states pay damages” and thus “may reasonably be perceived as having a financial stake in interpreting investment
treaties so as to expand the system’s compensatory promise for
investors.”242 Other less fundamental objections are directed to
ICSID’s lack of transparency243 and asserted proinvestor bias.244 Still
other objections are directed to problems allegedly caused by
inconsistencies among the rulings of various ICSID tribunals.245
These objections, which cast ICSID as an ad hoc, inconsistent,
and investor friendly forum, deeply threaten the system’s long-term

238. See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 26 (noting that the perceived legitimacy of
international institutions facilitates voluntary compliance).
239. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 104-05.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06; see also Cheng, supra note 34, at 1026
(noting that investment arbitration’s “continued growth and existence depends on the global
community believing that it is legitimate”).
241. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 4-6; see also Franck, supra note 33, at 1582-87
(summarizing concerns about the legitimacy of investment arbitration).
242. VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 5-6.
243. See Franck, supra note 33, at 1586; Statement by the OECD Investment Committee,
in OECD, TRANSPARENCY AND THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 1, 1-2 (OECD, Working Papers on International Investment, No.
2005/1, 2005), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/3/34786913.pdf.
244. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 5-6; see also Susan D. Franck, Empirically
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (2007)
(summarizing criticism and presenting evidence of win rates in ICSID arbitration).
245. See supra notes 211-12.
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viability.246 As an institution, ICSID has attempted to respond in a
number of ways. For example, in response to concerns about lack of
transparency, ICSID rules now permit the tribunal to allow third
parties to attend hearings unless one of the parties objects.247 ICSID
has also expressed support for the creation of an appellate mechanism, although so far no such tribunal has been established.248
Although these institutional efforts may have done little to satisfy
critics, arbitrators are no doubt aware of the criticism levied against
investment arbitration and may conduct the arbitration, or write
the award, with the criticism in mind. For example, arbitrators may
respond to concerns about lack of transparency by encouraging
parties to open the hearings to the public.249 Most relevant here,
arbitrators may also use the award to communicate information
designed to appease ICSID’s many critics. For example, the award
may discuss past awards explicitly and in depth, carefully situating
the tribunal’s decision within the broader network of decisions
rendered by other investment tribunals. This kind of direct engagement signals that the decision resulted from a deliberative, systematic process, rather than from an ad hoc balancing of the
equities in a particular case. Likewise, tribunals that explicitly
affirm the value of adjudicatory consistency and take pains to
explain any disagreement with past awards signal their commitment to predictability as an important system value.250

246. For a discussion of criticism directed at ICSID and proposed solutions, see Franck,
supra note 33, at 1582-610.
247. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS R. 32(2) (ICSID), in ICSID,
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15/Rev.1 (2003), available
at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/DocumentsMain.jsp (then follow “ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules” hyperlink).
248. See Yackee, Minimalist System, supra note 222, at 317-18; Alvarez, supra note 222,
at 915.
249. In a few recent cases, the parties did in fact open the hearings to the public. See
Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 812
(2008).
250. See Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Recommendation on Provisional Measures ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (search “Saipem”; then follow “ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7”
hyperlink; then follow “Decisions & Awards” tab; then follow “Decision on Jurisdiction”
hyperlink); see also City Oriente Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21,
Decision on Provisional Measures, 2007 WL 5366469, ¶ 87 (Nov. 19, 2007).
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At least in part, then, the existing system of investment law
precedent can be understood as the product of arbitrators’ disaggregated efforts to respond to fundamental challenges to ICSID’s
legitimacy and, more importantly, its viability. This does not mean
that ICSID is universally perceived as legitimate. Recent withdrawals from the ICSID Convention suggest to the contrary.251 Instead,
the point is that arbitrators’ engagement with past awards, and
their professed fealty to adjudicatory consistency, can be understood
as a reaction to the very public criticisms of investment arbitration
and as an attempt to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the
process.
b. A Counterexample: Employment Arbitration in the United
States
If I am correct that arbitral precedent serves to legitimize
investment arbitration, then ICSID may be relatively unique.
Indeed, developing a system of precedent will often be a poor
strategy for arbitrators seeking to attain legitimacy with external
actors. Here, employment arbitration within the United States is
especially instructive, particularly when compared to labor arbitration. The comparison yields the insight that arbitrators will often
lose legitimacy as producers of law when they compete with
adjudicators who enjoy greater perceived lawmaking legitimacy.
Recall that labor arbitration, as traditionally understood, does not
substitute for litigation in court.252 Most labor disputes involve
challenges based on a contractually determined “just cause”
standard that applies only to employees covered by the relevant
CBA. In this sense, the CBA “calls into being a new common
law—the common law of a particular industry or ... plant.”253 What
this means is that, to the extent labor arbitrators engage in
lawmaking activity, they do not compete with courts or other public
actors who enjoy greater perceived legitimacy. It follows, too, that
labor arbitrators who invest their energies in creating a system of
251. See, e.g., News Release, ICSID, Ecuador's Notification Under Article 25(4) of the
ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.
jsp (follow “Ecuador’s Notification under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention”).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
253. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960).

1948

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1895

precedent are not likely to encounter serious resistance. After all,
both employers and unions are likely to derive at least some value
from a system of precedent.254 And although courts asked to confirm
or vacate labor arbitration awards do serve some review function,
the extent of their review is limited both formally255 and, less
formally but more powerfully, by their sense of “the primacy and
exclusivity of arbitration within its proper sphere of contract
interpretation.”256
In employment arbitration, by contrast, efforts to create a system
of arbitral precedent would more likely encounter skepticism or
hostility, especially in substantive domains widely believed to be
within the exclusive domain of public adjudicators. Statutory discrimination claims are a prime example. Although judicial review
in such cases is formally limited,257 courts are likely to take particular interest in how arbitrators apply antidiscrimination law.258
Perhaps more importantly, skepticism about the value of arbitral
precedent may emanate from actors of even more immediate
significance to arbitrators: parties and their lawyers. After all,
courts remain active in interpreting the statutes that govern
employment relationships, and they regularly produce the contract
and tort law that underlies nonstatutory employment disputes.259
254. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
255. For a discussion of formal review standards, see ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 57,
at 53-77.
256. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 37 LAB. L.J. 437,
438-39 (1986).
257. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); Ware, supra note 16, at 711.
258. For example, courts that require reasoned awards in arbitrations involving federal
statutory rights justify the requirement as necessary to judicial review. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This justification is somewhat
fanciful given the limited nature of judicial review of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Ware,
supra note 16, at 724-25. Nevertheless, the signal to arbitrators—that the relevant law
derives from public rather than private sources—is clear.
259. Though a common objection is that arbitration impedes the development of law, the
extent to which it does so (if at all) depends on a number of factors. In employment cases, for
example, these factors include the prevalence of arbitration clauses; the extent to which
employers who arbitrate differ from those who do not (and, thus, the extent to which the
disputes remaining in court are likely to produce “skewed” law); the extent to which
arbitrators themselves produce law; and the extent to which any arbitral law is consistent
with the purposes of employment law generally. Drahozal, supra note 20, at 190, 207-14
(discussing several of these points). Moreover, even if over time courts have encountered fewer
meaningful opportunities to produce employment law, this may have less to do with
arbitration than with employers’ successful use of informal workplace structures to resolve
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Because of this, system users are likely to look primarily to these
public actors for relevant law and might even view it as usurpative
for an arbitrator to base a decision on the authority of past awards,
at least when relevant judicial precedent also exists.
Sometimes, of course, parties may choose arbitration precisely
because they wish to have their conduct judged according to a set of
alternate legal rules.260 In these cases, the arbitrator’s lawmaking
legitimacy derives precisely from the fact that the arbitrator need
not follow state-supplied law. When parties choose arbitration for
this purpose, it is fair to assume that conflict with judicial precedent
will be irrelevant to the arbitrator’s decision. Often, however,
parties will expect “to have their conduct judged by external legal
standards,”261 and in such cases arbitrators are likely to base their
decisions on external authority whenever possible.262
c. The Arbitrator’s Role in Fashioning Norms Concerning
Arbitral Precedent
As the example of employment arbitration illustrates, ICSID may
be relatively unique in that reliance on arbitral precedent enhances,
rather than detracts from, the perceived legitimacy of the process.
This Section briefly describes a second attribute that may distinguish ICSID from many other systems of arbitration: investment
arbitrators are well positioned to create and diffuse norms about
arbitral lawmaking.

disputes (and, in employment discrimination cases, the deference these structures receive
from courts). As I have argued elsewhere, the current preoccupation with arbitration obscures
what is perhaps a more important development: the internalization of dispute resolution
within the workplace. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool:
Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843,
849 (2008).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
261. Rau, supra note 126, at 88.
262. Cf. Lee, supra note 155, at 25-26 (suggesting that cost would deter arbitrators from
fashioning an alternative antitrust law even if they were allowed to do so). This is a slightly
different point from the one I am making. To be sure, parties who do not wish to contract
around antitrust law are not likely to fund the creation of an entirely different legal regime.
Still, they might derive some value from consistent application of arbitral awards in areas
where judicial authority was lacking. Given sufficiently strong norms against arbitral
lawmaking, however, even such weak forms of arbitral precedent might not arise.

1950

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1895

Multiple actors constitute the world of investment arbitration,
including states, multinational corporations and law firms, elite
international lawyers, arbitrators, academics, and nongovernmental
organizations with investment-related agendas, to name just a few.
Though these actors have discrete agendas and incentives, the
boundaries between them are permeable, especially to arbitrators.
Already an elite group, ICSID arbitrators not only preside over
investment arbitrations; many are also prominent academics,
lawyers who represent clients in investment disputes, or both.263
This places arbitrators in an ideal position from which to foster a
vision of ICSID as a system for promoting “the harmonious development of investment law.”264 In this vision, although “[i]t may be
debatable whether arbitrators have a legal obligation to follow
precedents ... they have a moral obligation to follow precedents so
as to foster a normative environment that is predictable.”265
As a rule, of course, arbitrators become arbitrators after achieving
some degree of professional success as an attorney, an academic, or
in some other relevant field. These and other experiences and
attributes facilitate entry into the profession and influence marketability. In this sense, arbitration creates a market in “symbolic
capital” in which an arbitrator’s professional and other characteristics confer legitimacy and authority with other system participants.266 Prominent academics, lawyers, and former politicians and
judges, to name just a few, may possess more symbolic capital and
be more highly sought as arbitrators.267
To a degree, this is true of all arbitration systems, including
international commercial arbitration.268 But it is especially true of
263. See Craig Forcese, Does the Sky Fall?: NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement and
Democratic Accountability, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 315, 329 (2006); Franck, supra note 33, at
1597-98; Judith Levine, Dealing with Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in International Arbitration,
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2006, at 60, 62; Jan Paulsson, ICSID's Achievements and Prospects,
6 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INV. L.J. 380, 395 (1991).
264. Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Recommendation on Provisional Measures ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (search “Saipem”; then follow “ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7” hyperlink; then follow “Decisions & Awards” tab; then follow “Decision on
Jurisdiction” hyperlink).
265. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 48, at 374.
266. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 126, at 18-19.
267. Id. (describing international commercial arbitrators).
268. See id.
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investment arbitration, in which private parties assert claims
against sovereign states.269 As I have noted, these disputes place a
premium on voluntary compliance and on extralegal means of
enforcement.270 Because of this, successful arbitrators must have a
great deal of symbolic capital, for system users will favor those who
“have clout with other arbitrators and with the parties who must
obey the decision.”271 Thus, as extremely prominent figures in the
world of investment arbitration, ICSID arbitrators are not merely
adjudicators, though of course that is part of their function. They
occupy multiple spaces within that world, effectively collapsing the
barriers between ICSID’s various actors.272 This enables arbitrators
to play a constitutive role somewhat at odds with the “arbitrator as
agent” model that underlies arbitration law in the United States.273
And they have used that role, in part, to foster system norms that
legitimize the use of arbitral precedent.274
III. MORE SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE OPERATION OF
ARBITRAL PRECEDENT
The discussion to this point has been, of necessity, somewhat
abstract. I have attempted to demonstrate that we can profitably
analyze the role of precedent in a diverse group of arbitration
systems by invoking a limited number of considerations. This final
Part moves from the abstract to the concrete. Drawing on the
general discussion thus far, it offers some specific hypotheses about
the ways in which arbitrators are likely to use precedent and
suggests a preliminary answer to the question posed earlier:
269. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 35, at 58-59.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80, 102-04.
271. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 126, at 18 (referring to arbitrators in international
commercial disputes).
272. Thus, many of the most frequently selected ICSID arbitrators also hold prominent
academic appointments. See Commission, supra note 34, at 140 tbl.2; see also Franck, supra
note 33, at 1597-98 (noting that investment arbitrators “are of the highest international order
and are distinguished former judges, respected scholars and practitioners, as well as former
government officials or others who have worked with international organizations”).
273. See supra text accompanying note 192.
274. See also Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of
Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 685, 724-25 (2007); Tai-Heng
Cheng, Power, Authority, and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 465, 51820 (2005).
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whether “modern-day arbitrators fashion a commercial, antitrust,
employment, maritime, securities, and contract law?”275
Consider first the prediction that some form of arbitral precedent
will arise in any system featuring reasoned, accessible awards. At
times, the arbitration literature comes close to suggesting this
possibility,276 and, as I argued above, it is not entirely implausible.277
But my reasons for doubting this prediction—at least when offered
as a general prediction applicable to all systems of arbitration
—should now be clear. One reason for doubt is that parties may, and
sometimes do, enter arbitration contracts that effectively forbid
arbitrators to develop precedent. Though the arbitration literature
is largely silent on this possibility, I do not take it to deny that
parties may prevent the creation of arbitral precedent in this
manner.
But even refined to predict that reasoned, accessible awards will
yield a system of precedent as long as the relevant contract does not
say otherwise, the hypothesis is difficult to defend. For one thing,
when disputes are governed by a thick body of state-supplied law,
arbitral precedent will serve little function. In such cases, parties
are not likely to research past awards themselves or to appreciate
arbitrators who invoke such awards in the face of ample judicial or
other authority. Moreover, participants in some arbitration systems
may view public rather than private actors as the primary, and
perhaps the only, legitimate producers of law. For example, I have
suggested that employment arbitrators in the United States are not
likely to produce a system of precedent because, in this context,
arbitrators will lack lawmaking legitimacy.278
Nevertheless, the role of reasoned, accessible awards merits
further exploration. As employment arbitration illustrates, there
are unsettling implications to the hypothesis that these structural
features might be sufficient to produce a system of arbitral precedent. For example, some courts require arbitrators to issue reasoned awards in cases involving statutory rights, justifying this
mandate as necessary to facilitate judicial review.279 But if reasoned,
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1202.
See supra note 92.
See supra notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.3.b.
See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997). As noted
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accessible awards are sufficient to produce some form of arbitral
precedent, these mandates applicable to “public law” cases may
have the (surely unintended) effect of facilitating the creation of
private legal rules.
Another set of hypotheses relates to the role of arbitrators and
other system participants in generating precedent. For example, we
might learn something about the function served by precedent
through exploring its use by repeat-play arbitrators. One possibility
is that repeat-play arbitrators will be more familiar with past
awards and thus more likely to cite them. Alternatively, established
arbitrators may be less likely to cite prior awards, perhaps because
they feel secure in the market for arbitration services; they are
being paid for their judgment, not for their knowledge of what other
arbitrators have done. Note that these divergent hypotheses reflect
very different views of the function served by arbitral precedent.
The first hypothesis suggests that precedent serves as a vehicle for
capturing and signaling professional status and prestige.280 The
second suggests quite the contrary—past awards provide a form of
cover, and invoking them is, in a sense, a low-status act.281
Other research might explore the role of disputants and their
lawyers in shaping the content of any arbitral precedent. Here,
information asymmetries between the disputants (or between their
lawyers) become especially relevant. Privately made law, of course,
is likely to differ from publicly made law, most obviously because
private parties are not likely to fund the production of law that
seriously disadvantages them.282 This fact—already problematic in
disputes calling for application of mandatory law—becomes especially so when users have unequal access to information about
arbitrators’ past awards.283 Future research might explore the
impact of these asymmetries on the law that is created and applied
in arbitration, as well as the extent to which arbitrators, or the
institutions that identify and train them, might prove a moderating
influence.
previously, this justification is somewhat fanciful given the limited nature of judicial review
of arbitration awards. See supra note 177.
280. On this point, see supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
282. See Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at 239.
283. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 92, at 772-73.
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Still other hypotheses relate to the potentially legitimizing
function of precedent. Recall that the existing system of ICSID
precedent may have resulted from arbitrators’ efforts to attain
legitimacy in the eyes of a wide range of external actors.284 That
strategy is a rational response to criticisms levied against ICSID,
especially the criticism that tribunals rendered ad hoc, inconsistent
decisions.285 But it would be a mistake to suppose that arbitrators
will seek to create precedent whenever critics object to the arbitration system’s supposedly ad hoc nature. As a strategy for attaining
legitimacy, precedent creation makes sense only within the relatively unique confines of ICSID. As I have noted, because most
investment-related disputes are resolved in arbitration, arbitrators
bear the primary responsibility for lending certainty and predictability to investment transactions.286 Without a more “legitimate”
body of law to profess fealty to, arbitrators can deflect some of the
criticism by fashioning a body of arbitral precedent.
But we should expect rather different legitimacy-seeking strategies when arbitrators preside over disputes that also appear in
court, especially when courts are perceived to be more legitimate
producers of law. Once again, consider employment arbitration as
an example. At least when conducted pursuant to predispute arbitration agreements, employment arbitration has long provoked
controversy.287 Moreover, because the prevailing party in an employment arbitration is likely to require judicial assistance to enforce
the award, arbitrators can be expected to draft awards that courts
will perceive as legitimate. In such cases, not only will arbitrators
not rely on arbitral precedent, they may quite explicitly signal their
reliance on, and fidelity to, state-created law by citing and purporting to follow judicial precedent.288
The foregoing discussion suggests an answer to the question:
whether “modern-day arbitrators fashion a commercial, antitrust,
employment, maritime, securities, and contract law.”289 At least
284. See supra Part II.C.3.a.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 230-31.
287. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and
Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379
(2006).
288. By contrast, in less controversial forms of arbitration, we might expect that arbitrators
will often decide cases without citing any precedent at all.
289. Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1202.
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with respect to antitrust, employment, and securities law, the
answer is likely to be “no,” at least not yet. Indeed, there is reason
to doubt that arbitral precedent will evolve in any U.S. arbitration
systems involving federal statutory rights, at least as long as courts
continue to preside over comparable cases and continue to view
arbitration with hostility.290 In antitrust and employment disputes,
for example, arbitration substitutes for litigation before national
courts.291 Because courts view arbitration with some suspicion and
are frequently involved in enforcing arbitration agreements and
awards, the need to attain legitimacy with these external actors
may lead arbitrators to produce awards that emphasize their
fidelity to state-supplied law.292 Moreover, because courts continue
to preside over employment and antitrust litigation, system users
are not likely to derive great benefits from a system of arbitral
precedent. Indeed, any effort to create a robust system of precedent
might encounter skepticism or outright resistance.293
The explanation is somewhat different for securities disputes.
Although securities arbitration often involves nonwaivable statutory
rights,294 arbitration is thought to be the principal method of
resolving disputes involving broker-dealers.295 Securities arbitration
thus bears some weak resemblance to investment arbitration; in
each case, arbitrators preside over disputes that might otherwise be
heard in national courts (or, in the case of ICSID, before some more
publicly accountable international tribunal). But because virtually
all disputes are resolved in arbitration, the responsibility to generate substantive legal rules falls by default to arbitrators. Thus, it

290. See Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by Statute:
Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551, 556 (2008)
(noting that “there is now a measurable degree of judicial hostility to arbitration in state
courts”).
291. See John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for
Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 227-28 (1986)
(noting that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 requires federal courts to stay litigation on
any issue that is within the scope of a valid arbitration clause).
292. See supra text accompanying note 288.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
294. See Brunet & Johnson, supra note 92, at 489.
295. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 15.1, at 638-41 (2009);
Jennifer J. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder Claims, 36 SEC.
REG. L.J. 181, 182 (2008); Johnson, supra note 232, at 124.
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is possible that securities arbitration, like investment arbitration,
might evolve system norms that support arbitral lawmaking.296
The fundamental problem, however, is that securities arbitration
is structurally inconsistent with the creation of precedent. Securities
arbitration awards are published, and securities arbitrators may,
and sometimes do, issue reasoned awards.297 But historically, norms
in securities arbitration have disfavored reasoned awards,298 and the
available evidence suggests that securities arbitrators do not often
issue them. For example, in an examination of customer cases
closed by NASD arbitrators in 2003 and 2004, Professor Jennifer
Johnson found that fewer than 5 percent of the awards provided
even a brief explanation for the result, and fewer than half of these
included anything “that would be deemed an opinion by any stretch
of the definition.”299 Because most securities awards are unreasoned,
it is unlikely that arbitrators will view them as having any value as
precedent.300
Note one important implication of this discussion: none of these
arbitration systems is incapable of producing precedent. As I have
argued elsewhere, arbitration systems may generate precedent even
in disputes raising federal statutory questions.301 In securities
arbitration, the problem is largely structural: the lack of reasoned
296. See supra note 222.
297. For cases filed before April 16, 2007, NASD rules require a written award that
identifies the parties and their lawyers, summarizes the issues in dispute, the relief
requested, the damages or other relief awarded, other issues resolved, and other basic
information. See NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION R. 10330 (Nat’l Ass’n Sec. Dealers 2009),
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Rules/CodeOfArbitrationProcedure/ (then follow
“Code of Arbitration Procedure” hyperlink). In cases filed after that date, the rules are similar
but add that the award “may contain a rationale underlying the award.” CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES R. 12904(f) (Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.
2009), http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Rules/CodeofArbitrationProcedure/ (then
follow “Customer Code” hyperlink); see also id. at R. 13802(e).
298. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 33, at 1484 (noting that securities arbitration awards did
not provide written findings or opinions and that recent changes by NASD had merely
required awards to “state the issues covered”).
299. Johnson, supra note 232, at 144-45.
300. See Koruga v. Ming Wang, NASD No. 98-04276, 2000 WL 33534559, at *11-12 (2001)
(Meyer, Arb.) (noting that the parties had collectively cited twenty prior arbitrations in
support of their respective positions but that none of the cited awards “purport[ed] to explain
why the clearing broker, under the facts of the specific case, is either legally insulated from
liability or, on the other hand, is liable to customers for the fraud of their correspondents”).
301. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 69, 103-06 (2007).
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awards. In antitrust and employment arbitration, the explanation
lies in the fact that courts continue to produce relevant law,
continue to view arbitration with hostility, or both. Together, these
factors reduce system users’ demand for arbitral precedent, the
incentives for arbitrators to produce it, and the perceived legitimacy
of arbitrators as producers of law. Yet these conditions may change
and, if they do, we may yet see arbitrators develop antitrust,
employment, and securities law.
Much of the preceding discussion highlights the relevance of
attitudes concerning arbitrators as producers of law. Thus, I close
with a final hypothesis: such attitudes may be “sticky.” That is, it is
possible that norms concerning the propriety of arbitral lawmaking—whether permissive or restrictive—may be too strong. For
example, arbitrated statutory rights disputes may also raise a host
of recurring issues that public actors may overlook, never consider,
or lack power to change. These include routine procedural questions
that arise in arbitration,302 as well as contract interpretation
questions when all disputes under the relevant contract—say, an
employee handbook—are referred to arbitration. On questions like
these, system users might plausibly derive some benefit from a
system of arbitral precedent. Yet if I am correct that participants in
employment arbitration systems generally do not view awards as
legitimate sources of authority, a system of precedent may not arise.
That is, the general norm against treating past awards as precedent
might crowd out some legitimate and possibly beneficial lawmaking
opportunities.
Conversely, in systems featuring strong norms legitimizing
reliance on past awards, that general norm might lead arbitrators
to rely on past awards even when adjudicating claims invoking
statutory rights. Labor arbitrators, for example, frequently adjudicate claims that include allegations of discrimination, although
these are typically contract-based, rather than statutory claims.303
302. Cf. Bjorklund, supra note 48, at 190-94 (noting that investment treaties are unlikely
to address procedural matters and that the development of arbitral precedent seems
inevitable).
303. Labor arbitrators encounter at least two such claims. First, an employee may be
disciplined or discharged for violating company policies designed to prevent or remedy
workplace discrimination. See, e.g., In re Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 555, 561 (2003) (Salkovitz Kohn, Arb.) (concluding that the employer lacked just cause
to discipline employee for failing to report alleged sexual harassment as required by company
policy). Second, an employee may claim that the employer has acted in a discriminatory
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After 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, however, labor arbitrators may
more frequently encounter statutory discrimination claims.304 To
what extent will labor arbitrators’ permissive views regarding the
use of arbitral precedent affect their handling of these disputes?
These questions follow from the recognition that different arbitration systems feature varying attitudes towards arbitrators as
producers of law.
CONCLUSION
Few of the questions I have asked bear on the content of arbitral
precedent. Such questions are important, of course, and worthy of
further inquiry. But they are logically secondary to questions
concerning whether and when arbitrators generate precedent at all.
As investment and labor arbitration clearly demonstrate, the
“whether” question cannot seriously be debated. At a minimum,
then, the arbitration literature should acknowledge that fact.
Much remains unknown about the “when” question, and this
Article has offered only a modest beginning. Yet arbitration is not
a unitary phenomenon. Arbitration systems may differ in a variety
of ways, including their award-writing and publication practices; the
parties, lawyers, and arbitrators involved; the applicable substantive law; the incentives under which arbitrators operate; the extent
to which arbitration substitutes for litigation in court; the perceived
legitimacy of arbitrators as lawmakers; and countless other differences that likely impact each system’s operation and capacity to
create precedent. The goal of this Article has been to provide an
analytical framework for taking these differences into account. By
doing so, future research can shed valuable light on arbitration, not
only as a dispute resolution mechanism, but also as a method for
generating robust systems of private law.

manner in violation of a nondiscrimination provision in the CBA. See, e.g., In re Akzo Noble
Coatings, Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1093, 1096-97, 1100 (2001) (Fullmer, Arb.) (finding
that employer’s failure to qualify employee for job vacancy did not violate nondiscrimination
provision in CBA). It bears repeating that, in such cases, the arbitrator’s task is to interpret
and apply the CBA.
304. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (holding that federal law requires enforcement of
provision in collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

